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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 841, IATSE
OPINION AND AWARD
and
American Broadcasting Company

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Company violating Sections 1
and 18 of the contract? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on November 20, 1974 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Union complains that certain graphic art work
is being subcontracted by the Company inviolation of Sections
1 and 18 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Those Sections read in pertinent part, respectively:
1
we hereby recognize you as the
representative of such employees and agree
that all graphic art work executed by
employees of the Company for television
broadcasting will be executed by employees
hereunder. We agree that in no event will
such work be subcontracted for the purpose
of evading the provisions of this agreement.
18. It is the intention of the Company on
Company produced shows to channel all Title
Graphic Art intended for television broadcasting through the Graphic Art Department,
except where the exigencies of time make this
impracticable or impossible....

-2I find no contract violation.

Certain significant

facts are either stipulated or undisputed.

The Company has

been and is subcontracting graphic work used on several of
its regular news and documentary programs, most significantly
the Reasoner Report, Directions, People Places Things.

This

work has been subcontracted for several years, and was not
objected to by the Union until recently, when the quantity
of overtime work available to the bargaining unit was sharply
reduced.

(The Union explains that the reduction in overtime

opportunities for the bargaining unit impelled it to formally
object to what previously it was willing to overlook.)

There

has been no increase in the quantity of the work subcontracted.
Indeed the record indicates that there has been some diminution.
The number of bargaining unit employees employed in the Graphic
Arts Department has increased despite the subcontracting.
Considering the foregoing I find no violation of
Section 1 of the contract.

It is undisputed that all graphic

art work executed by employees of the Company are executed by
members of the Union within the bargaining unit covered by
this contract.

In view of the fact that there has been no

increase in the amount of the subcontracting and that the
bargaining unit has been increased, together with the undisputed
fact that overtime work is not guaranteed, I cannot conclude
that the subcontracting of the disputed work, a practice of
long standing, constitutes an evasion of the contract.

-3-

Even assuming, as the Union argues that the phrase in
Section 18, "to channel all Title and Graphic Art.... through
the Graphic Art Department" means that bargaining unit
employees of the Graphic Art Department are to perform that
work, the balance of the first sentence of Section 18 allows
the Company to subcontract where the exigencies of time make
assignment of the work to the Graphic Art Department impracticable
or impossible.

The Company has offered sufficient evidence in

the instant case to show that the disputed work was subcontracted
because insufficient time was available in the production of
the television programs involved, for the work to be done on
time by the Graphic Art Department.

(Also, in at least one

situation the Company demonstrated it did not have the necessary
equipment to perform the work but has since ordered or received
such equipment and plans hereafter to assign the work to
bargaining unit employees of the Graphic Art Department.)
The Company's case with regard to the exigencies of time
and the impracticability of assigning the disputed work to the
Graphic Art Department stands basically unrefuted by the
Union.

Instead, the Union argues that with better planning,

more time would be available and the Graphic Art Department
would thus be able to perform the work rather than have it
subcontracted.
argument.

This may be so, but it remains a matter of

The unrefuted fact is there are time exigencies

-4covering virtually all of the disputed work and hence circumstances are present which permit the Company to subcontract
the work within the exception set forth in Section 18.
Additionally, as previously indicated with reference to Section
1, the disputed work is not new to subcontracting, has been
subcontracted for an extended period of time; has not increased
in quantity; and there is indication that more of it will
remain inside with the acquisition of new and necessary equipment.
Considering all of this, I fail to see any violation of Section
18.

An absolute prohibition on subcontracting or the elimination

of "exigencies of time" as an exception to a subcontract bar,
are matters for collective bargaining and not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named Parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Company is not violating Sections
1 and 18 of the Contract.

Eric y. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 26, 1974
STATE OF: New York ) .
COUNTY OF: New York ) " "
On this twenty sixth day of December, 1974, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Retail Store Employees Union
Local 400
and

'
'
i
'
'
'
1

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.

Opinion
and
Award

'

i

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance over the discharge of Gwendolyn
Purcell arbitrable?
A hearing was held in Washington, B.C. on July 8, 1974 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to present their
respective cases.

The Arbitrator's oath and the contract pro-

vision for a tri-partite Board of Arbitration were waived.
The Company argues that the grievance should be deemed nonarbitrable because it was submitted to arbitration some three
and one-half months after the Company's last step answer.

It

contends that three and one-half months constitutes an unreasonable delay; and makes the traditional arguments that during that
period of time the Company's potential liability for back pay has
been "running" and that witnesses may no longer be available or
their memories of the event may have faded.
The grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract
(Article XVIII) contain no express time limit within which a
grievance is to be referred to arbitration after the steps of
the grievance procedure have been completed.

The contract does

require the Union to give notice of its intention to contest a

- 2 discharge or disciplinary action within 30 days.

Or in other

words there is an express contractual time limit within which
the Union must grieve but no express time limit within which
it must go to arbitration after the grievance steps have been
completed.
Clearly the parties knew how to impose a time limit. They
did so in connection with filing the grievance.

That they did

not with regard to submitting an unresolved grievance to arbitration, means, to my mind, that no such express time limit was
intended.
This is not to say that I reject the Company's argument
that a reasonable time limit to submit a grievance to arbitrtion should be implied.

I agree that grievances must be sub-

mitted to arbitration within a reasonable time after the grievance procedure has been completed to protect the Company from
the obligation to arbitrate stale or abandoned grievances, or
grievances which because they have not been submitted to arbitration for an extended period of time are appropriately deemed by the Company to be dropped.

But under the circumstances

of this case, I do not find the period of three and one-half
months from the Company's final answer to the date that the
Union referred the grievance to arbitration to have reached the
point of unreasonableness.

I need not in this proceeding

determine what the point of unreasonableness

is, except to hold

that under the circumstances of this case, and in the absence
of a contract time limit which the parties could have but did
not negotiate, three and one-half months does not reach that
point.

- 3 The fact is that though the Company advanced the classical
argument that witnesses may be unavailable and memories may
fade, no evidence was offered to show that these disabilties
are present in the instant case.

Additionally, the question

of potential back pay liability is always a matter which an
Arbitrator may consider (if he decides the merits of the case
against the Company) in light of any unusual delay between the
completion of the grievance procedure and the referral of the
case to arbitration.

And the Company's right to argue to an

Arbitrator that because of the three and one-half month period
of time which elapsed, its back pay liability should be reduced
or otherwise mitigated if the discharge of the grievant is to
be reversed, is expressly reserved.
Accordingly the Undersigned having been duly designated
as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following Award:
The grievance over the discharge of Gwendolyn Purcell
is arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York
)
COUNTY OF New York) ' '"
On this
day of July, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1630 0058 74

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ADMINISTRATOR
IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION:
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION - and - THE CITY OF
NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Fire Officers Association,
Uniformed Firefighters Association
and

AWARD
of
Impartial Chairman
Case #A-345-74

The City of New York (Fire Department)

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreements between the above named parties and
having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties at
hearings on January 7th and 8th, 1974, makes the following AWARD:

The Unions have not offered or adduced
sufficient evidence to show that the
transfers set forth in Departmental Order
No. 3 dated January 4, 1974 were for the
reason or reasons for which two weeks
notice is required under Article XXV Section
4 D 1 of the UFOA contract and Article XXVII-A
Section 4 D 1 of the UFA contract. Therefore
the grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: January 14, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss> .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 14th day of January, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
r

Uniformed Firefighters Association,
Local 94

'
'
1

Award
and
Opinion

and
City of New York

'

The Union and City are in disagreement over the precise
scope of the "productivity" Recommendations of the Impasse
Panel Report and Recommendations(1-105-73) dated November 11,
1973.

They have agreed to submit their disagreement to me,

as sole Arbitrator for final and binding determination.
The parties waived an oral hearing and submitted their
respective positions by briefs.
Having duly considered the entire record before me I
render the following Opinion and Award.
The productivity Recommendations of the Impasse Panel
dealt with the manning of companies equipped with "rapid
water," and with the manning of the "second vehicle" referred
to in Article XXVII Section 6 of the prior contract.
The Union contends that the Impasse Panel Recommendations
regarding the manning of companies equipped with rapid water
is confined to the 53 companies (49 engine companies and 4
squads) which were equipped with rapid water at the time of
the Impasse Panel hearing and Recommendations.

The City

asserts that the Recommendations are ongoing, and apply not
only to those 53 companies but prospectively to any companies
which in the future are similarly equipped with rapid water.
As to the Impasse Panel Recommendation regarding the

- 2 manning of companies consisting of two pieces of equipment,
or in other words the question of what has been colloquially
referred to as "Schmertztnen," the Union contends that it is
confined to the 6 of such companies in operation at the time
that the Impasse Panel hearings were held and the Recommendations made.

The City argues that the Recommendation is applic-

able to all those two-piece companies which operated during
the life of the prior Collective Bargaining Agreement and
which are and were covered by the provisions of Article XXVII
Section 6.

The City states that there were and have been 12

such companies.

(Apparently for operational reasons, 6 of the

original 12 were discontinued some time after the negotiation
of the prior contract and before the Recommendations of the
Impasse Panel.)
"Rapid Water" Companies
Based on a review of the stenographic record of the Impasse Panel hearings, I conclude that the City's presentation
on this issue was limited to the 53 companies which then, and
now, are equipped with rapid water.

That presentation, togeth-

er with a reading of the Impasse Panel Recommendation, which
recommended a reduction in the "present manning,"

which cal-

culated the specific total sum of money to be saved, which calculated the savings per fireman, and which stated the number
of firemen positions affected, lead to the compelling conclusion that the Impasse Panel exercised its authority over only
those 53 companies which then and now are equipped with rapid
water.

- 3 Accordingly the Recommendations were not intended to
cover the prospective possibility of equipping additional
companies with rapid water, and the manning of those companies
when and if they become so equipped.
this issue is therefore

The Union's position on

sustained.

(However it should be clear that the foregoing answers
only the narrow question presented to me.

It is not desposi-

tive of other possible related questions, such as the rights
of the parties under the contract and in upcoming bargaining
in case of technological changes affecting companies beyond
the 53 covered.)

"Schmertzmen"
The Impasse Panel Recommendation on this issue is directly related to and expressly modifies Article XXVII Section 6
of the prior contract.

As such it was obviously intended to

change the manning requirements in all circumstances previously
covered by that Article.
Therefore the reduction in the manning of two-vehicle companies from 7 (5 on the primary vehicle and 2 on the secondary
vehicle,) to a total complement of 5, applies to the manning of
any and all companies which now operate or have at any time
during the life of the prior contract operated under the coverage of Article XXVII Section 6.
In other words the Impasse Panel Recommendation covers not
only the 6 companies which were in operation at the time that

- 4those Recommendations were made, but the additional 6 companies which had been subject to said Article when the prior
contract was negotiated, even though their operation was discontinued thereafter.

Hence the operation of any or all of

said 12 companies during the present contract shall be subject to that manning Recommendation, namely that the City be
permitted to operate the two vehicles of each said company
with a total complement of 5 men.
Accordingly the City's position on this issue is sustained.

Eric J/Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March 18, 1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) "' :
On this 18th day of March, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that the executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION AND - THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

The Uniformed Firefighters Association

'
Opinion
'
and
'
Award
'Case #A-325-73
'

and
The City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
Should the Superpumper differential of $600. be
included in determining the night shift differential of Fireman First Grade Franklin Kreisl,
and if so as of when?
At a duly noticed hearing Mr. Kreisl and representatives
of the Union and City appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
The contract language upon which the Union relies was
first negotiated in 1968 and the night shift differential became effective January 1, 1969.

The provision for a night

shift differential has been perpetuated in each Collective
Bargaining Agreement since.
It is undisputed that only a few months ago did a fireman's
pay check first indicate or "break out" from his total pay the
amount of the night shift differential.

Hence the Union argues

that it was not until then that the grievant or the Union knew
that the $600. Superpumper differential was not included in
the night shift differential for first grade firemen working
on the Superpumper.

I accept that explanation as a defense

to the City's claim that the issue is procedurally non-arbitrable,

- 2 There was testimony concerning the original 1968 negotiations and specifically the negotiation of the night shift
differential clause and stipulations regarding the inclusion
of $600. differential in figuring other benefits.

However, I

find that the best evidence in the instant issue is the apparent undisputed fact that subsequent to the negotiation of the
night shift differential clause, a representative of the City's
Office of Labor Relations met with certain of the then leaders
of the Union for the express purpose of arranging the application of the night shift differential to the various grades of
firemen.

None of the Union witnesses at this arbitration case

were at that meeting and therefore none was able to testify as
to what arrangements were made with regard to a first grade
fireman assigned to the Superpumper.

However, the City offer-

ed the testimony of Mr. Thomas Laura who was the City's representative at that meeting.

Mr. Laura testified unequivocally

that not only did he and the then leadership of the Union
(which has since changed) agree on the apportionment of the
night shift differential amongst the grades of firemens

but

that there was explicit agreement that the $600. Superpumper
differential would not be utilized in calculating the night
shift differential for firemen assigned to the Superpumper.
Mr. Laura's testimony stands unrebutted and hence, in
my judgment, is determinative of the instant issue.
The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties

- 3 -

makes the following Award;
The Superpumper differential of $600. shall not
be included in determining the night shift differential of Fireman First Grade Franklin Kreisl.
The Union's grievance is denied.
J
Eric J./Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: March 18, 1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) '''
On this 18th day of March, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN - UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS

ASSOCIATION

- and - THE CITY OF NEW YORK

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association
and
The City of New York

OPINION
and
AWARD

The stipulated issue is:

The issue is the Union's allegation
that under Department Order 225 the
City has violated or inequitably
applied the existing policy of the
Fire Department not to transfer members
of the Fire Department for punitive
reasons or arbitrary and capricious
reasons.
Also implicit within the stipulated issue is that the
Order, or any part thereof not be violative of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Hearings were duly held at which representatives of the
above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and to crossexamine witnesses.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

I conclude that several different, divergent and over
lapping reasons brought about the planning, promulgation and
implementation of Department Order 225.

Some of those reasons

and results were fully proper under the collective bargaining
agreement and Department policy as managerial prerogatives.
Others however, were violative of the collective agreement
or contrary to Department policy as set forth in the stipulated
issue, and hence improper.

In short the propriety of Depart-

ment Order 225 is a "mixed bag", partially in accordance with
the contract and Department policy and partially inconsistent
therewith within the meaning of the stipulated

issue.

- 2Specifically as I see it, the reasons and results of
Department Order 225 can be summarized in pertinent part
as follows:
1.

The disputed transfers in each instance made
room for a newly appointed probationary fireman.

Though in previous similar situations

probationary firemen were introduced into
active service by assignment to existing
vacancies, thereby making transfers of veteran
firemen unnecessary,

I find nothing in the

contract or Department policy that prohibits
the Department from effectuating transfers
to create openings for probationary firemen.
So long as the transfers creating the vacancies
do not constitute violations or inequitable
application of existing Department policy not
to transfer for punitive, arbitrary or capricious
reasons, and are not in violation of the contract,
the Department may make use of the transfer
method to create vacancies for probationary firemen as a proper exercise of its managerial function,
Neither the Union nor the ..Arbitrator has the
authority to substitute their judgements for that
of the Department in determining to which Companies
the probationary firemen will be assigned
and in what numbers.

Those determinations

-3-

are clearly managerial prerogatives, and again unless they
generate punitive, arbitrary or capricious
transfers, are not reviewable in arbitration.
2. The transfers and Department Order 225 were an
implementation by the new Fire Commissioner of
a policy he long advocated as Chief of Department, namely a regular program to transfer men
from existing locations to other work locations;;:
for the legitimate needs and good of the Department.
And that lower level officers, such as Company
Commanders would for the first time play more
significant roles in developing and carrying out
that program.

Though that transfer program was

much broader in scope, more on a preplanned and
scheduled basis, and would involve many more involuntary transfers than previously undertaken by
the Department, I ^conclude it was and is a proper
exercise of the Departments managerial authority,
provided the transfers involved did not violate
Fire Department policy as recited in the stipulated
issue.
3. Companion to No.2 above, some of the transfers under
Order 225 were designed to give relief to veteran

-4firefighters who had been working in heavy running
areas and were deemed overworked, by transfering
them to less demanding locations.

Involuntary

transfers for this reason are a proper exercise
of the Departments managerial prerogatives.
Similarly, some of the transfers were for the bona
fide purpose of giving firemen new and different
fire fighting experiences, such as for example
moving them from multiple dwelling areas to office
building locations and/or to areas dominated by
private frame dwellings.

Inasmuch as different

or varied fire fighting techniques are required
in these different types of locations, transfers
for this purpose were and are proper.
4. Some of the transfers under Order 225 were not
involuntary but rather voluntary.

Firemen were

transferred pursuant to transfer requests on file
to locations they requested.

It is undiluted that

those transfer under Order 225 were proper and they
are not challenged by the Union.
5. However some of the transfers were contrary to
criteria laid down by the Commissioner or the
Department.

For example in some cases the most

junior, most inexperienced firemen were transferred
rather than those who by age, length of service and
heavy work schedules deserved or needed relocation
to less demanding areas.

Where junior firemen

-5were transferred not for new work experiences
and/or not to more demanding locations, but
rather only to make room for probationary firemen contrary to criteria laid down by the
Commissioner or the Department, those transfers
were arbitrary, violative of Department policy

and hence improper under the Stipulated ISSUe,
6. The unilateral, precipitous transfer of some
union delegates among the approximately one hundred
and forty eight men transferred under Order 225
constituted a breach by the Department of the
Union's representation rights under the collective
bargaining agreement.

Union delegates are recognized

representational agents of the Union not only under
the Union's constitution and by-laws but under the
collective bargaining agreement.

For the Department

to unilaterally and precipitously transfer a
delegate without reasonable prior notice to the
Union, effectively terminates the Union's right of
representation at the delegate level.

It is not

for the Department to judge the authority or
prestige of the delegates as Union representatives.
It is sufficient that the delegates play a recognized
role in administering the contract on behalf of the
Union and its members.

Hence it is not for the

Department to make a unilateral distinction between
delegates and members of the Union's executive board,
by transferring the former with little or no notice

-6while exempting the latter group from inclusion
in the transfer order. As both are official Union
representatives their relative authorities and
need in carrying out the contract on behalf of
the Union are natters for the Union to decide or
are at least for mutual decision of the parties.
This is not to say that delegates are immune from
transfer.

That would freeze a relatively large

group of individuals and thereby hamper any legitimate transfer program of the Department.

A rule

of reason must be applied between the Union's
right to maintain its contractual representation
at the delegate level and the Department's right
to effectuate legitimate transfers.

Therefore,

though the Department may transfer delegates,
before it does so it must give reasonable notice
to the Union to afford the Union reasonable time
to replace that delegate without loss of continuity
of representation or to attempt to dissuade the
Department from transferring that particular
delegate.

Order 225 as it applied to the delegates,

did not give the Union this reasonable notice, and
its effect was to improperly deny the Union the
delegate representation to which it was contractually
entitled in those tsan situations.

And I deem that

improper whether the inconclusion of delegates
in Order 225 was inadvertant, unknowing or willful.

-7—
7.

Some of the transfers underOrder 225 were for
reasons of "attitude".

Someifiremen who were

deemed to have the "wrong attitude" or "a poor
attitude" about the area in which they worked;
about the citizens of that area; about the officers
over them; about the discipline, routine or duties
assigned them; or who were suspected of some misconduct or of setting "poor" examples for other
men in their companies; or who showed less than
satisfactory dedication to their work, were involuntarily transferred for those reasons.

The

question before me is not whether the D partment
should have the right and power to transfer for
these reasons but whether transfers for those
reasons are violative of Department policy within
the meaning of the stipulated issue.

Frankly I

can see circumstances where the Department should
be able to use its transfer power fro attempt to
cure or rehabilitate a fireman with any of those
"attitude" problems.

But no matter how viewed,

transfers for those reasons, in my judgement
constitute punishment for an unsatisfactory or
troublesome attitude, and hence are punitive in
nature within the meaning of the stipulated issue.
In the face of the Department8^ assertion that its
existing policy is not to transfer for punitive
reasons, and that none of the transfers under
Order 225 were punitive, I must find that those
transfers based on attitudinal inadequacies,

suspected misconduct, and/or an inadequate level

of dedication to duty were inconsistent with the
stated policy and therefore improper.

This of

course is without prejudice to the right of the
Department to discipline under the prescribed disiplinar
procedures.
Finally, based on the record, I consider it a
logical and reasonable inference that Order 225
was, in part at least, the Department's retaliatory
response to the November sixth strike.

Though the

record does not contain "smoking pistol" evidence
in clear support of the Union's charge of retaliation
there are too many unusual and circumstantial
factors, which taken together cannot be brushed off
as innocent, coincidental or meaningless.

Order 225

followed the strike by less than three weeks.

It

was announced at the end of one week effective at
the beginning of the next, without any other notice
to the affected employees or the Union.

The order

was conceived, planned, and structured in unprecedented
secrecy.

Though Department officials met, formulated

the plan, set forth standards and criteria for
transfers, and ordered Company Commanders to produce
lists of possible transferees, no memoranda, written
instructions, meeting minutes or journal book entries
of any of these transactions were made prior to the
formal issuance of the order.

The order was the

broadest in scope and covered more firemen than
any prior involuntary transfer order, and for
the first

time a fjfcgptfiafeirift number of Union

delegates were included.

In some instances Company

Commanders were ordered to produce names for
transfers within a matter of hours or less, and
in some cases were directly ordered to do so or
unceremoniously overruled when-'they protested.
Again this is not to say that the Department
should not have the right to respond, indeed to
retaliate against an unlawful strike, by using
its transfer power to break up cliques; to restore
discipline; to restructure companies in such a
way as to reduce the chances of future unlawful
acts and to serve notice on the employees that
future misconduct may result in transfers.

Rather

itis to say that such reasons and purposes are
obviously punitive in nature, and in light of the
stipulated issue and the stipulated Department
policy not to transfer for punitive reasons, an
order retaliatory in nature is contrary to that
existing Department policy and improper.

In

short I infer that one reason /or one use of
Order 225 was to make clear to firemen that
future unlawful acts or breaches of Departmental
discipline will be sternly dealt with including
the use by Company Commanders of their newly
acquired power to recommend transfers. Again,
while I can see circumstances otherwise justifying

-10-

the use of the transfer "weapon" in this manner,
the Department's existing policy as stipulated by
the Department presently forecloses that use and
it is to that existing policy and the stipulated
issue that I am bound.
It should be clear that I make no determination
of whether the Department committed an "improper
practice" within the meaning of the Taylor Act
or the New York City Collective Bargaining Law.
Nor do I determine whether because the Union's
strike was not a "protected activity" the Department's retaliatory intent is exempt from any
improper practice characterization.

These are

matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of another
forum, and are not before me or within my authority
in this arbitration.
What remains is the question of what is to be done.
Or in other words, if some directive or remedy is
to be fashioned by this Arbitrator, how can the
improper reasons and results of Order 225 be unscrambled from those that were legitimate.
The issue as to the delegates is severable however.
Os-A-ii--*-^'"

Only tite- are involved, and based on the record none
wish to remain at the locations to which they were
transferred.

Additionally there is the .' institutional

-11right of the Union to delegate representation
as previously enunciated in detail.

Therefore

within twenty days from receipt of this Award
the Union delegates transferred under Order 225
shall be transferred back to the Companies and
locations from which they were transferred under
that Order.
As for the remaining transferees underOrder 225
it would be manifestly wrong to reverse all of
them inasmuch as many were based on proper and
bona fide grounds.

Also I deem it neither

practicable nor remedial to attempt to pick out
those particular transfers that were based in
whole or in part on the improper grounds delineated
above.

Not only is the record not complete on

that but the problem might well be exacerbated
by again dislocating an employee who has adjusted
to his new assignment and does not wish to return
to his original work location despite the imprqpriety of his transfer.
An appropriate "unscrambling" and an appropriate
decision to my mind is to direct a representative
partial reversal of Order 225 equivalent as far
as possible to those improper reasons on which
Order 225 was based; and to uphold the Order
partially to an extent equivalent to those proper
reasons on which the Order was founded.

-12-

During the course of the hearings in this
matter and in an effort to work out a settlement of the dispute (an attempt that failed)
I asked the Union to make a survey of all the
transferees of Order 225 (as well as those
covered by another order not at issue herein)
to determine which and how many wish to return
to their original companies.

At my request the

Union made such a survey and submitted it to
me and to the City.
I do not have the precise figures before me at
this distance, but my recollection is that under
Order 225 approximately thirty-five transferees
including the delegates, out of the one hundred
and forty eight transferred want to return to
the Companies from which they \^~e transferred.
If that figure is correct
3t I consider it to be reasonably
equivalent to that part of Order 225 which I have
found was based on improper grounds.

Therefore

in addition to the foregoing Awaxd regarding the
delegates I shall direct that between the date this
Award is received and my return to the United States
i -i

(on September 2) the Union and the City meet and

-13attempt, within the intent and holding of this
decision to arrange the return of those and that
number of firemen to their original Companies
within a forty-five day period subsequent to the
receipt of this Award.

If those figures are in-

correct and/or if the parties cannot work out
the retransfers as aforementioned, I will make a
final ruling on that remaining question within a
matter of days after my return.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: August 25, 1974
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES)
ISLAND OF MINDANAO
)ss:.
CITY OF DAVAO
)
On this twenty-fifth day of August, 1974 came before me
Eric J. Schmertz known to me to be the person who executed the
Aforegoing document and who acknowledged to me that he executed
the same in my presence.

Notary Public

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN - UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
- and - THE CITY OF NEW YORK

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION
Uniformed Firefighters Association
and
The City of New York

and
AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
The issue is the Union's allegation that
under Department Order 225 the City has
violated or inequitably applied the existing policy of the Fire Department not to
transfer members of the Fire Department for
punitive reasons or arbitrary and capricious
reasons.
Also implicit within the stipulated issue is that the
Order, or any part thereof not be violative of the collective bargaining agreement.
Hearings were duly held at which representatives

of

the above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and

to cross-examine witnesses.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
I conclude that several different, divergent and over
lapping reasons brought about the planning, promulgation and
implementation of Department Order 225.

Some of those reasons

and results were fully proper under the collective bargaining
agreement and Department policy as managerial prerogatives.
Others however, were violative of the collective agreement
or contrary to Department policy as set forth in the stipulated
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issue, and hence improper.

In short the propriety of

Department Order 225 is a "mixed bag," partially in accordance with the contract and Department policy and partially
inconsistent therewith within the meaning of the stipulated
issue.
Specifically as I see it, the reasons and results of
Department Order 225 can be summarized in pertinent part as
follows:
1.

The disputed transfers in each instance made
room for a newly appointed probationary fireman.

Though in previous similar situations

probationary firemen were introduced into active
service by assignment to existing vacancies,
thereby making transfers of veteran firemen
unnecessary, I find nothing in the contract
or Department policy that prohibits the Department from effectuating transfers to create openings for probationary firemen.

So long as the

transfers creating the vacancies do not constitute violations or inequitable application of
existing Department policy not to transfer for
punitive, arbitrary or capricious reasons, and
are not in violation of the contract, the Department may make use of the transfer method to create
vacancies for probationary firemen as a proper
exercise of its managerial function.

Neither

the Union nor the Arbitrator has the authority
to substitute their judgements for that of the
Department in determining to which Companies the
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probationary firemen will be assigned and in
what numbers.

Those determinations are clear-

ly managerial prerogatives, and again unless
they generate punitive, arbitrary or capricious
transfers, are not reviewable in arbitration.

2.

The transfers and Department Order 225 were an
implementation by the new Fire Commissioner of
a policy he long advocated as Chief of Department, namely a regular program to transfer men
from existing locations to other work locations
for the legitimate needs and good of the Department.

And that lower level officers, such as

Company Commanders would for the first time
play more significant roles in developing and
carrying out that program.

Though that transfer

program was much broader in scope, more on a preplanned and scheduled basis, and would involve
many more involuntary transfers than previously
undertaken by the Department, I conclude it was
and is a proper exercise of the Department's
managerial authority, provided the transfers
involved did not violate Fire Department policy
as recited in the stipulated issue.

3.

Companion to No. 2 above, some of the transfers
under Order 225 were designed to give relief to

-4veteran firefighters who had been working in
heavy running areas and were deemed overworked,
by transfering them to less demanding locations.
Involuntary

transfers for this reason are a

proper exercise of the Department's managerial
prerogatives.

Similarly, some of the transfers

were for the bona fide purpose of giving firemen new and different fire fighting experiences,
such as for example moving them from multiple
dwelling areas to office building locations and/
or to areas dominated by private frame dwellings
Inasmuch as different or varied fire fighting
techniques are required in these different types
of locations, transfers for this purpose were
and are proper.

4.

Some of the transfers under Order 225 were not
involuntary but rather voluntary.

Firemen were

transferred pursuant to transfer requests on
file to locations they requested.

It is un-

disputed that those transfers under Order 225
were proper and they are not challenged by the
Union.

5.

However some of the transfers were contrary to
criteria laid down by the Commissioner or the
Department.

For example in some cases the most
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junior, most inexperienced

firemen were trans-

ferred rather than those who by age, length of
service and heavy work schedules deserved or
needed relocation to less demanding areas.
Where junior firemen were transferred not for
new work experiences and/or not to more demanding locations, but rather only to make room for
probationary firemen contrary to criteria laid
down by the Commissioner or the Department,
those transfers were arbitrary, violative of
Department policy and hence improper under the
stipulated issue.

6.

The unilateral, precipitous transfer of some
union delegates among the approximately one
hundred and forty eight men transferred under
Department Order 225 constituted a breach by the
Department of the Union's representation rights
under the collective bargaining agreement.

Union

delegates are recognized representational agents
of the Union not only under the Union's constitution and by-laws but under the collective
bargaining agreement.

For the Department to uni-

laterally and precipitously transfer a delegate
without reasonable prior notice to the Union,
effectively terminates the Union's right of
representation

at the delegate level.

It is not

-6for the Department to judge the authority or
prestige of the delegates as Union representatives.

It is sufficient that the delegates

play a recognized role in administering the
contract on behalf of the Union and its members.

Hence it is not for the Department to

make a unilateral distinction between delegates
and members of the Union's executive board, by
transferring the former with little or no
notice while exempting the latter group from
inclusion in the transfer order.

As both are

official Union representatives their relative
authorities and need in carrying out the contract on behalf of the Union are matters for
the Union to decide or are at least for mutual
decision of the parties.

This is not to say

that delegates are immune from transfer.

That

would freeze a relatively large group of
individuals and thereby hamper any legitimate
transfer program of the Department.

A rule of

reason must be applied between the Union's
right to maintain its contractual representation at the delegate level and the Department's
right to effectuate legitimate transfers.

There-

fore, though the Department may transfer delegates, before it does so it must give reasonable
notice to the Union to afford the Union reasonable time to replace that delegate without loss
of continuity of representation or to attempt
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to dissuade the Department from transferring
that particular delegate.

Order 225 as it

applied to the delegates, did not give the
Union this reasonable notice, and its effect
was to improperly deny the Union the delegate
representation to which it was contractually
entitled in those situations.

And I deem that

improper whether the inconclusion

of delegates

in Order 225 was inadvertant, unknowing or
willful.

7.

Some of the transfers under Order 225 were for
reasons of "attitude."

Some firemen who were

deemed to have the "wrong attitude" or "a poor
attitude" about the area in which they worked;
about the citizens of that area; about the
officers over them; about the discipline,
routine or duties assigned them; or who were
suspected of some misconduct or of setting
"poor" examples for other men in their companies;
or who showed less than satisfactory dedication
to their work, were involuntarily transferred
for those reasons.

The question before me is

not whether the Department should have the
right and power to transfer for these reasons
but whether transfers for those reasons are
violative of Department policy within the meaning of the stipulated issue.

Frankly I can see

-8circumstances where the Department should be
able to use its transfer power to attempt to
cure or rehabilitate a fireman with any of
those "attitude" problems.

But no matter how

viewed, transfers for those reasons, in my
judgement constitute punishment for an unsatisfactory or troublesome attitude, and hence
are punitive in nature within the meaning of
the stipulated issue.

In the face of the

Department's assertion that its existing
policy is not to transfer for punitive reasons,
and that none of the transfers under Order 225
were punitive, I must find that those transfers
based on attitudinal inadequacies, suspected
misconduct, and/or an inadequate level of
dedication to duty were inconsistent with the
stated policy and therefore improper.

This of

course is without prejudice to the right of the
Department to discipline under the prescribed
disciplinary procedures.
8.

Finally, based on the record, I consider it a
logical and reasonable inference that Order 225
was, in part at least, the Department's retaliatory response to the November sixth strike.

-9Though the record does not contain "smoking
pistol" evidence in clear support of the
Union's charge of retaliation there are too
many unusual and circumstantial factors,
which taken together cannot be brushed off
as innocent, coincidental or meaningless.
Order 225 followed the strike by less than
three weeks.

It was announced at the end of

one week effective at the beginning of the next,
without any notice to the affected employees
or the Union.

The order was conceived, planned,

and structured in unprecedented secrecy.

Though

Department officials met, formulated the plan,
set forth standards and criteria for transfers,
and ordered Company Commanders to produce lists
of possible transferees, no memoranda, written
instructions, meeting minutes or journal book
entries of any of these transactions were made
prior to the formal issuance of the order.

The

order was the broadest in scope and covered
more firemen than any prior involuntary transfer
order, and for the first time a number of
Union delegates were included.

In some instances

Company Commanders were ordered to produce names
for transfers within a matter of hours or less,

-10and in some cases were directly ordered to
do so or unceremoniously overruled when they
protested.

Again this is not say that the

Department should not have the right to respond,
indeed to retaliate against an unlawful strike,
by using its transfer power to break up cliques;
to restore discipline; to restructure companies
in such a way as to reduce the chances of
future unlawful acts and to serve notice on the
employees that future misconduct may result in
transfers.

Rather it is to say that such reasons

and purposes are obviously punitive in nature,
and in light of the stipulated issue and the
stipulated Department policy not to transfer
for punitive reasons, an order retaliatory in
nature is contrary to that existing Department
policy and improper.

In short I infer that one

reason or one use of Order 225 was to make clear
to firemen that future unlawful acts or breaches
of Departmental discipline will be sternly dealt
with including the use by Company Commanders
of their newly acquired power to recommend
transfers.

Again, while I can see circumstances

otherwise justifying the use of the transfer

-11"weapon" in this manner, the Department's
existing policy as stipulated by the Department presently forecloses that use and it is
to that existing policy and the stipulated
issue that I am bound.
It should be clear that I make no determination
of whether the Department committed an "improper
practice" within the meaning of the Taylor Act
or the New York City Collective Bargaining Law.
Nor do I determine whether because the Union's
strike was not a "protected activity" the
Department's retaliatory intent is exempt from
any improper practice characterization.

These

are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction
of another forum, and are not before me or
within my authority in this arbitration.
What remains is the question of what is to be
done.

Or in other words, if some directive or

remedy is to be fashioned by this Arbitrator,
how can the improper reasons and results of
Order 225 be unscrambled from those that were
legitimate.
The issue as to the delegates is severable however.

Only a few are involved, and based on the

record none wish to remain at the locations to
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which they were transferred.

Additionally there

is the institutional right of the Union to
delegate representation as previously enunciated
in detail.

Therefore within twenty days from

receipt of this Award the Union delegates
transferred under Order 225 shall be transferred
back to the Companies and locations from which
they were transferred under that Order.
As for the remaining transferees under Order 225
it would be manifestly wrong to reverse all of
them inasmuch as many were based on proper and
bona fide grounds.

Also I deem it neither

practicable nor remedial to attempt to pick out
those particular transfers that were based in
whole or in part on the improper grounds delineated above.

Not only is the record not complete

on that but the problem might well be exacerbated
by again dislocating an employee who has adjusted
to his new assignment and does not wish to return
to his original work location despite the impropriety of his transfer.
An appropriate "unscrambling" and an appropriate
decision to my mind is to direct a representative
partial reversal of Order 225 equivalent as far
as possible to those improper reasons on which
Order 225 was based; and to uphold the Order

-13partially to an extent equivalent to those
proper reasons on which the Order was founded.
During the course of the hearings in this matter
and in an effort to work out a settlement of the
the dispute (an attempt that failed) I asked the
Union to make a survey of all the transferees
of Order 225 (as well as those covered by another order not at issue herein) to determine
which and how many wish to return to their
original companies.

At my request the Union

made such a survey and submit ted it to me and to
the City.
I do not have the precise figures before me at
this distance, but my recollection is that under
Order 225 approximately thirty-five transferees
including the delegates, out of the one hundred
and forty-eight transferred want to return to
the companies from which they were transferred.
If that figure is correct I consider it to be
reasonably equivalent to that part of Order 225
which I have found was based on improper grounds
Therefore in addition to the foregoing Award
regarding the delegates I shall direct that
between the date this Award is received and my

-14return to the United States (on September 2)
the Union and the City meet and attempt, within the intent and holding of this decision to
arrange the return of those and that number of
firemen to their original companies within a
forty-five day period subsequent to the receipt
of this Award.

If those figures are incorrect

and/or if the parties cannot work out the retransfers as aforementioned, I will make a
final ruling on that remaining question within
a matter of days after my return.

(Signed)

Eric J. Schmertz
Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: August 25, 1974
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES)
ISLAND OF MINDANAO
) SS * :
CITY OF DAVAO
)
On this twenty-fifth day of August, 1974 came before me
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to the person who
executed the aforegoing document and who acknowledged to me
that he executed the same in my presence.

(Signed)

Epifanio Estradado
Notary Public

(212)

682- 638O
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CHANIN BUILDING
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September 16, 1974

Mr. Kalman Seigel
Editor, Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036
To the Editor:
Your editorial Oil on the Fire of September 11, 1974
presented a one-sided analysis of my arbitration decision
and wrongly appraised my authority as the arbitrator.
I directed a "representative partial reversal" of the
transfer order because I found that some of the transfers
were for punitive or arbitrary reasons in violation of
the Fire Department's policy not to transfer firemen for
those reasons. That was the narrow and precise issue which
the City and the union presented to me for determination.
To have made such a finding of fact and still upheld all
of the transfers would have been inconsistent with the
issue presented, in violation and in excess of my authority,
and under arbitration law, would have jeopardized the
validity of my decision.
Your editorial failed to state that I found many valid
reasons for most of the transfers and that in several
respects the bulk of the transfers were based on a proper
exercise of the Fire Department's managerial prerogatives.
Your editorial did not note that I upheld the Fire
Commissioner's right to make transfers not just for the
"legitimate needs and good of the Department" but also on
several other specific and important grounds, a right first
enunciated and codified in my decision and a right which
the union had steadfastly refused to acknowledge.

Oil on the Fire
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Your editorial did not state that I expressed the view
that the Department ought to have a policy and right, in
response to an illegal strike, to transfer firemen guilty
of misconduct, to restore discipline, to break up cliques,
and to otherwise serve notice that further misconduct would
be dealt with severely. But in view of the Department's
acknowledged contrary policy I could not uphold those transfers
in this case which were violative of that policy, and by consequence violative of the collective bargaining agreement.
Your editorial did not disclose that I expressly reserved
the Department's right to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against any fireman accused of misconduct, even if his transfer
was inconsistent with the Department's transfer policy.
Also, my decision clearly implied that in my view, because
the union's strike was illegal and hence not a "protected
activity" the Department's retaliatory response was not an
improper practice under the New York State Taylor Act or the
New York City Collective Bargaining Law.
Your editorial suggests that Supreme Court Justice Burton
B. Roberts was bound to more rigid legal restraints in the
criminal case arising out of the strike than was I as the
arbitrator in the transfer case. Quite the contrary. An arbitrator's authority is limited to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and in some instances, as here, even
more limited by the issue stipulated by the parties. Justice
Roberts had vastly greater power and authority. First with the
indictments and then the guilty pleas of certain leaders of
the firemen's union, he was armed with the power to impose
jail sentences unless some other arrangement both dispositive
of the offenses and in the public interest was achieved.
With that power and leverage he was able to entertain and
encourage a flexible note,i bargained" result which satisfied
iMose objectives. A review of your news reports at that time
will show that Justice Roberts discussed his plans with me,
among others, and that I fully supported what he sought to do
and ultimately worked out.
For almost a decade, as impartial chairman between the
City of New York and the firefighters, as the mediator in
several contract negotiations, as Chairman of the panel which
arbitrated the contract dispute following the strike and which
rendered a decision editorially commended by the New York Times
as "sensible", and as a public member of the Office of Collective Bargaining, I have devoted my efforts towrds the estab-
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Oil on the Fire

lishment of stable, responsible and lawful labor relations
between the City and the union in the public interest.
You correctly state that "one admirable contribution of
impartial arbitration as a means of settling labor-management
disputes is that the arbitrator seeks to interprete contract
obligations in a way that will permit orderly and constructive
future relations between employer and unionized employees."
A full reading of my decision will show that it is not inconsistent with both those objectives.
Very truly yours,
Eric XJ. Schmertz
Arbitrator

EJSrhl

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 185 IUE, AFL-CIO
Award
and
CTS of Ashville, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated January 21, 1972 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Paeties, Awards
as follows:
The phrase "total earnings" in Article 11A
Sections 1 through 8 includes vacation pay
paid employees in the prior year. For the
vacation years covered by the grievance the
Company shall include vacation pay in its calculation of the total earnings of the affected employees for the fiscal year ending May 31.
Appropriate upward adjustments in vacation pay
entitlements under Article 11A Sections 1
through 8 shall be paid to the affected employees .

Eric J. Schtnertz
Arbitrator

.
DATED: JulyV 1974
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this I/ day of July, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same .
Case No. 3130 0118 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 185 IUE, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
GTS of Ashville, Inc.

In accordance with Article 16 of the Collective

Bargaining

Agreement dated January 21, 1972 between GTS of Ashville, Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 185, IUE
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned
was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Does the phrase "total earnings" in Article 11A
Sections 1 through 8 include the vacation pay
paid the employees in the prior year? If so, to
what remedy are the affected employees entitled?
A hearing was held in Ashville, North Carolina on January
20, 1924 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

The

The parties filed post

hearing briefs and the hearing was declared closed as of July 2,
1974.
The Company's defense in support of its contention that
vacation pay paid employees during the fiscal year is not part
of "total earnings1' under Article 11A is primarily based on
nine years of "past practice."

The Company argues that the

phrase "total earnings" is ambiguous; that under that circumstance past practice is controlling; that the unvaried past
practice has been to exclude the prior year's vacation pay

- 2 in calculating total earnings; that the Union knew or should
have known of this practice and has thereby acquiesced and
accepted the practice as the proper interpretation of the contract.
I reject the Company's argument simply because I do not
find the phrase "total earnings" to be ambiguous.

Based both

on my experience and my research I am satisfied that it is well
settled that "earnings" includes vacation pay.

Absent condi-

tional or restrictive language or a special contractual definition of the word "earnings," paid vacations are regularly interpreted as part of an employee's annual earnings.

In the

instant case the contract contains no restrictions, conditions
or any limiting definition of the word "earnings" or the phrase
"total earnings."

I find it no different from other "fringe"

payments such as holiday pay, bereavement pay, shift bonus,
overtime pay and cost of living increases, which the Company
concedes are included as part of "total earnings" under Article
11A.
Accordingly I interpret the phrase "total earnings" as
clear - - t o include vacation pay which an employee received
during the fiscal year ending May 31.
It is similarly well settled that past practice or
acquiescence in a practice is applicable only where contract
language is ambiguous or otherwise unclear.

But where, as

here, because the word "earnings" and the phrase "total earnings" are not ambiguous but rather widely accepted as including vacation pay, a past practice different from the contract
provision is binding only until challenged and only until

- 3 either party serves notice that it intends to enforce the contrary contract language.

Therefore the practice upon which

the Company relies, and its argument concerning the Union's
acquiescence in that parctice, is applicable for the vacation
years prior to the period covered by the instant grievance.
But the instant grievance constitutes notice by the Union seek ing a return to the contract language as written and to its
proper interpretation.
In short, it is immaterial if the Union knew or should
have known of the practice since 1966.

That is not prejudic-

ial to the Union's right to now insist that the contract, rather than the contrary past practice be followed, beginning with
the vacation years covered by the instant grievance.
In addition to the foregoing conclusion regarding the well
settled meaning of the phrase "total earnings," there are additional facts supportive of the Union's position in this case.
The Company acknowledged that it proposed the precise wording
of the disputed contract language.

A fundamental rule of con-

tract law is that disputed language should be interpreted
against the party who wrote it.

Also, there is evidence that

when the Company proposed the phrase "total earnings," it told
the Union that it included "all earnings."

Had the Company in-

tended to exclude vacation pay, it should have said so.

That

it did not, and that no such restriction was placed in the contract must be construed as adverse to the position upon which
the Company now relies.

Additionally, it is undisputed that

under similar contract language between this Company and the

- 4United Auto Workers at Elkhart, vacation pay for the prior
years vacation paid during the fiscal year ending May 31, is
and has been included as part of an employee's "total earnings11
for calculation of the next year's vacation pay.

Though not

alone determinative, that method of administering substantively similar contract language by the Company at a different location and with a different union, is evidence that the contract
phrase "total earnings" has not been interpreted unequivocally
by the Company to exclude the prior year's vacation pay.

In-

deed the practice at Elkhart is fully consistent with the broadly accepted meaning of the word "earnings," and the phrase
"total earning" as previously mentioned.
Finally, I do not accept the Company's assertion that to
find for the Union would constitute "pyramiding vacation pay."
If an employee works 52 weeks a year, two weeks of which, for
example, is paid vacation, his vacation pay is nothing more
than regular pay for the 2 weeks he is on vacation.

So, where

an employee takes his vacation and receives vacation pay for
that time away from the job, he receives nothing more than
wages, which are clearly earnings.

And to include those wages

as part of his total earnings during any fiscal year is obviously and logically proper.

It would constitute "pyramiding"

only if he worked during his vacation and both his vacation pay
and wages for the same period of time were included as part of
"total earnings" in calculating the next year's vacation entitlement.

Under that example an employee would receive not only

vacation pay but also two weeks wages because he worked during

- 5 his vacation period; or in other words 54 or more weeks pay for
a 52 week period.

To include both as part of his total earnings

would constitute pryamiding.

But that circumstance is not part

of the instant grievance nor what the Union seeks.

And the

Union has stipulated that total earnings, so far as direct wages
and vacation pay are concerned, may not exceed 52 weeks in any
given year.
Accordingly the Union's grievance is granted.

For the

vacation years covered by the instant grievance the total earnings of the affected employees shall include vacation pay paid
them during the fiscal year ending may 31.

Appropriate adjust-

ments in their entitlement under Article 11A of the contract
shall be made.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 I.B.T Milk Drivers and
Dairy Employees Union

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Dairymen's League on behalf of
Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there good cause for the discharge
of George Cuccia? If not, what shall
the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration
Association on May 15, 1974 at which time Mr. Cuccia, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
To reverse the grievant's discharge I would have to
believe that his truck ran at two miles to the gallon of
gasoline; that on the day in question, when the grievant
drove no more than 30 miles, fifteen gallons of gasoline were
consumed; that the grievant purchased ten gallons

of gasoline

in two five gallon containers (in two successive transactions
at the same gas station) at a time during the gasoline shortage
when the law prohibited sales in cans of such quantities;
that the sale took place even though the station attendants
could not identify the grievant the very next day when he,
together with respresentatives of the Employer visited the
gas station for the very purpose of authenticating his story;
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that Company representatives who observed the grievant's
truck testified falsely that they saw him remove cans of
gasoline from the interior of the truck where milk is
stored (whereas the grievant asserted he carried the gasoline
cans in the driver's cab) and that the phone call to the
Company regarding the grievant's conduct was false.

These are conclusions which I would have to reach in
order to accept the grievant's defense.

I cannot do so be-

cause, cumulatively surrounding the same event, they are so
implausable a series of circumstances as to be unbelievable.

Accordingly, for disciplinary purposes the Company
has met its burden of establishing its case by the quantum
and standard of proof required in such matters.

And for the

offense, the penalty of discharge is proper.

The Undersigned having been duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following Award:
There was good cause for the discharge
of George Cuccia.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 31, 1974
STATE OF: New York ) Ss.:
COUNTY OF: New York)
On this 31st day of May, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to be to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Lay Faculty Association Local 1261,
American Federation of Teachers
and

Opinion
and
Award

Henry M. Raid High School Association

Though the stipulated issue is:
Whether the Henry M. Hald High School Association breached Article XXII of the Collective Bargaining Agrement in that it has failed to adhere
to the procedures as outlined in Section 1-R Department Chairmen, regarding the selection of
Department Chairmen at Bishop Reilly High School
the underlying and threshold issue is whether the Faculty and
Staff Handbook Diocesan High Schools is part of the Collective
Agreement, subjecting claimed violations of the Handbook to
the grievance and arbitration procedures of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Article XXXI).
Hearings were held on January 17 (on another issue subsequently held in abeyance) and on March 18 and March 28, 1974,
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Association appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Post hearing briefs were filed.
The underlying and threshold issue is answered in the affirmative.

Article XXII incorporates the Handbook by express ref-

erence into the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
in pertinent part reads:

Said Article

- 2 The parties to this Agreement have established a
Handbook Committee for purposes of developing
Association-Wide policies, professional procedures
and other working conditions as referred to in the
Preface to the Handbook.
The Handbook Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Union, the religious teachers
in the member schools, Principals of the member
Schools and the Association.
This Committee is a standing committee and is
authorized to compose a handbook, the sections of
which shall be effective for all teachers covered
by this Agreement when submitted to and approved
by the Association.
Vc •/<••& •/'/'<•

I deem the language!
"the sections of which shall be effective for all
teachers covered by this Agreement when submitted
and approved by the Association"
to incorporate the substantive provisions of the Handbook, as
they affect the lay teachers covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as conditions of employment within and under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Had the parties not intended the Handbook as part of the
contract they should and could have conditioned its reference
with appropriate restrictive language in that regard, or at
least with a limitation which foreclosed from the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the contract, claimed violations of
the Handbook.

Such restrictive or conditional language could

easily have been included either in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement generally, particularly in Article XXII, or as part
of the Arbitration clause, or in the Handbook itself.
limiting language is to be found.

No such

Clearly, by other types of

limitations negotiated in the contract, the parties well knew
how. to maintain the Handbook independent of the contract or

- 3 immune from the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
contract had they intended to do so.
But they did not.

By application of well settled contract

law, any prior agreement to the contrary is superceded by and
merged in the subsequent and clear language of the Collective
Agreement and the latter places no limitation on the contractual application of the Handbook as it applies to faculty covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (There is no dispute
that the Handbook clause in question, namely Section 1-R, was
submitted to and approved by the Association pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article XXII of the contract.)
Having found that the terms and provisions of the Handbook
are incorporated into and constitute terms and conditions of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement by operation of Article XXII
it follows that a claimed violation of a Handbook provision is
an "allegation of a violation of (the) Agreement" within the
meaning of Article XXXI.

Hence the instant grievance, namely

an alleged violation of Section 1-R of the Handbook is a grievance within the meaning of Article XXXI of the contract and
subject to arbitration thereunder.

Accordingly the Association'

contention that the issue is not arbitrable because the Handbook
is not subject to arbitral review is rejected.
In this regard I do not find that Section 4 of the Handbook constitutes a "grievance procedure" which supercedes or
ousts the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract
from consideration of a claimed violation of the Handbook.
Section 4 only sets up a "review group" to "clarify and inter-

- 4 pret Handbook items."

But I do not find it to be an adjudica-

tory procedure for the resolution of disputes and therefore, so
far as the lay faculty is concerned, does not constitute either
an adequate or intended substitute for the grievance and arbitration provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
I fail to see, as the Association argues, how the foregoing could be interpreted to apply the Collective Bargaining
Agreement to the religious faculty.

Undisputedly the Handbook

is applicable to the religious as well as to lay faculty.

The

incorporation by reference of the Handbook into the Collective
Bargaining Agreement means simply that the provisions of the
Handbook as they affect lay faculty become conditions of employment under the Collective Bargaining Agreement only for those
employees, (i.e. the lay faculty) covered by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

Hence my findings herein in no way extend

collective bargaining rights or the right to arbitrate Handbook
disputes to any faculty member or employee not covered by
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The evidence adduced in connection with the stipulated
issue indicates that the Association did not specifically follow
the procedure required by Section 1-R of the Handbook in the
appointment of the Science and Social Studies Department Chairmenat Bishop Reilly High School.

However, I deem it unnecessary

to determine whether the Union grieved that violation within
the specified time limitations of Article XXXI of the contract,
simply because I find it impracticable and unnecessary to fashion a remedy.

To reverse the appointment of the two Depart-

- 5 mental Chairmen is not only not feasible but could be disruptive
to the educational plans and programs.

And to require the

Association to canvas the faculty members of each affected Department anew would, in my judgment, be nothing more than a pro
forma exercise culminating in the same result.

Therefore,

other than finding that the Association violated the contract
by its failure to consult with all members of the affected Departments when, as the evidence shows, certain faculty members
who were not consulted were available for consultation, no remedy is awarded.
The Undersigned, having been designated as the Arbitrator
between the above named parties and having been duly sworn and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following Award;
The Faculty and Staff Handbook Diocesan High Schools
as it affects the lay faculty covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, is incorporated in and is
part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by operation of Article XXII of said Agreement. As such,
claimed violations of the Handbook are grievances
within the meaning of Article XXXI of the contract
and subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions thereof.
The Association breached Article XXII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in that it failed to adhere
to procedures outlined in Section 1-R - Department
Chairmen, regarding the selection of the Science and
Social Studies Department Chairmen at Bishop Reilly
High School. Whether the Union grieved within the time
limits required under Article XXXI of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement is immaterial because no remedy
is awarded.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

- 6 DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of July, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
Local 45 Culinary and Bartenders Union
and

AWARD

Host Services Of New York, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties, makes the following AWARD:

The Company's discharge of Xavier Colombier
under Section 9 (c) of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 21, 1973 was
proper and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

Dated: July 31, 1974
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

SS.

On this 31st day of July, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 892, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 74K14431

Mainway Warehouse Co.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition
of the Union's grievance dated
May 29, 1974?

A hearing was held at the Company plant in Secaucus,
New Jersey on October 9, 1974 at which time representatives
of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The parties were afforded an opportunity to file

post-hearing briefs.
The Union's grievance dated May 29, 1974 reads:
All work and duties of the
Operator of Mainway Warehouse
that is being done by outsiders
shall be discontinued and reinstated to the Operator of
Mainway Warehouse.
The Union is complaining that certain "switching" duties
previously performed by the Operator have been assigned to
non-bargaining unit employees in violation of the collective

-2bargaining agreement.

More specifically, it is the Union's

contention that non-bargaining unit truck drivers or
"shuttlers" bring trailer/trucks to the company's location,
positioning them in the yard and open the trailer doors in
readiness for loading, and that this is work previously
performed by the bargaining unit Operator and constitutes
"switching" within the meaning of his job duties.
The record does not support the Union's contention.

I

find that the Company made a method change regarding the
manner and sequence of the arrival of trailer/trucks at the
warehouse; that this change in method involves equipment and
personnel (i.e. trucks and drivers) neither previously nor
presently covered by the collective bargaining agreement; that
as a consequence there has been a substantial reduction in
the amount of switching work now required; that by practice
the work of "switching" is different than as alleged by the
Union; and that what switching work remains is performed
exclusively by the Operator as needed, and not transferred
or assigned to non-bargaining unit personnel.
Prior to the change, trailer/trucks and drivers not
covered by the collective bargaining agreement arrived at
the Company's location at various hours during the day.

The

drivers drove the trailer/trucks into the Company's yard
and positioned the trailers at locations for loading or
elsewhere if all the loading locations were occupied.

If

a trailer was placed at a loading bay the driver also opened
the doors to ready the trailer for loading.

As now,that initia

-3positioning was performed not by the Operator
non-bargaining

unit driver.

but, by the

Also previously, towards the

close of the work day a number of trucks arrived and were
positioned in the Company's yard overnight to be loaded, the
following day.

More trucks than could be position for load-

ing arrived at that time and congestion within the yard
resulted.

Nonetheless, entry into the yard and the parking

of each trailer either at a loading bay or elsewhere was
performed by non-bargaining unit truck drivers.

Only the

following day, as trailers had to be switched from whereever they were parked to the loading bays did the bargaining
unit Operator perform that work.

In other words, moving a

trailer within the yard from a location at which it was
initially placed by a non-bargaining unit driver to a loading point constitutes "switching" within the meaning of the
contract.
Under the method change trailer/trucks no longer arrive
at the close of the business day and trailers do not remain
in the yard overnight.

Instead, utilizing a "staging area"

elsewhere, trailer/trucks are shuttled to the warehouse at
regular and orderly intervals, so, as each arrives it can
be positioned as before by the driver (or in this case the
shuttler), but more frequently at a loading bay.

A backlog

of parked trailers elsewhere in the yard awaiting room at a
loading bay has

been sharply reduced during the day and

virtually eliminated overnight.

Consequently, a sharp re-

duction in the amount of switching work has resulted.

But

after a trailer has been parked in the yard by a shuttler,

-4but not at a loading bay, its movement thereafter to a
loading position is still performed by the bargaining unit
Operator.
In short, trailer/trucks enter the yard and are
initially positioned now as previously by a non-bargaining
unit employee.

Since that work was not previously done by

the Operator it is not switching work and accordingly has
not been transferred to non-bargaining unit personnel.
Switching work, as before, (meaning the moving of trailers
from the position in which they were initially placed in
the yard by the truck driver, to a loading bay) is still
exclusively performed by the Operator, although the need
for it has been sharply reduced by the method change.
I find no restriction on the Company's right to make
the instant method change.

The change was for a bona fide

reason; operations have been made more efficient and productive.
Additionally, because the change involved equipment and personnel
not covered by the collective bargaining agreement that
agreement does not bar the Company from installing the new
method.

Moreover, the Operator is not guaranteed a continuing

and unchangeable quantity of switching work.

Rather the

contract guarantees only that when switching work is to be
performed, if any, it is to be done by the bargaining unit
Operator as part of his job classification.

That the quantity

of that work has diminished is not a contract violation so
long as what switching work remains is assigned to the
Operator.

I find that the Company has met this requirement.

-5Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

The Union's grievance dated
May 29, 1974 is denied.

Eric/'j. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 6, 1974
STATE OF:New York
)ss .
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this sixth day of December, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

'
' Industry-Wide
"
Award
'
and
'
Order
'
'

and

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of all Members

On June 23, 1970 I rendered an Industry-wide Award and
Order setting forth the contractual and procedural obligations
of all Employers under Article IV of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

That Award and Order are incorporated by reference

herein and made part hereof.
Thereafter, on September 8, 1970 I rendered an Award implementing the Industry-wide Award and Order of June 23, 1970.
I found certain Employers in violation of Article IV and my
Industry-Wide Award and Order and I directed them to pay damages to the Union.

The September 8, 1970 Award is incorporat-

ed by reference herein and made a part of it.
In substance, both the aforementioned Awards directed all
Employers to comply with all provisions of Article IV of the
contract.

The Awards expressly provided that Employers may only

dispatch those drivers who, following their probationary period,
have joined the Union, paid the Union initiation fee, and are
paid-up Union members in good standing within the meaning of
the law and Article IV of the contract.
The Awards made clear that Employers who dispatched drivers who did not meet those requirements were liable to the

- 2 Union for ordinary damages and, in case of continued violations,
punitive damages.
The rulings, principles and admonitions set forth in the
aforementioned Awards are re-affirmed and reiterated herein,
and are effective, binding and enforceable now, retroactively
for the entire period since those Awards were rendered, and for
the future (until and unless changed by the mutual agreement
of the Union and the Board of Trade.) The parties shall make
reference thereto.
In a memorandum dated May 7, 1974 to the Members of the
Board of Trade, its counsel, Maurice H. Goetz, Esq., correctly stated the provisions, rulings, requirements and import of
my Awards of June 23 and September 8, 1970.

Mr. Goetzr memor-

andum is incorporated by reference herein and made a part hereof.

Reference thereto shall be made.
On May 13, 1974 I convened a meeting between representa-

tives of the above named parties to discuss the Union's assertion that large scale violations of Article IV of the contract
had been taking place over an extended period of time despite
my foregoing Awards.

At that meeting the Union presented a

large number of grievances charging many employers with violations .

The Union contended that virtually all Employers were

in violation of Article IV and my prior Awards, and that the
Union had not received the requisite initiation fees and/or
dues from as many as 16,000 employees over an extended period
of time.

On behalf of the Employers Mr. Goetz vigorously

denied the magnitude of the alleged violations.

- 3 Irrespective of the actual extent of the Union's complaints,
the records: produced and the contentions made by the Union at
that meeting persuade me that violations have been committed
by a sufficient number of Employers in a significant number of
situations over a long enough period of time to warrant another
Industry-wide Award and Order as follows:
All Employers shall comply with all provisions of
Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Following the probationary period an Employer may
not dispatch a driver who is not a member of the
Union; who has not paid the Union initiation fee;
and who by failure to pay or tender Union dues is
not a paid up member of the Union in good standing
within the meaning of Article IV and the law.

The

Employer shall take steps to ascertain an employee's
status pursuant to the contract and to the procedures
outlined in my prior Awards.

Additonally (in response to another portion of the
Union's complaint) the attention of all Employers
is called to Section 5 of Article IV.

Each Employer

shall comply therewith by furnishing to the Union
once a month a list of new employees covered by the
contract, hired by such Employer during the preceding month.

Employers who violate Article IV, this Award or my
prior Awards of June 23 and September 8, 1970 shall

- 4 be subject to ordinary and punitive damages under
conditions previously stated.

The Union's pending

grievances alleging violations of Article IV and my
prior Awards, shall not now be adjudicated.

How-

ever, an Employer who hereafter violates Article IV,
this Award, or my Awards of June 23, and September 8,
1970, and/or fails to comply with Mr. Goetz' memorandum of May 7, 1974 shall be liable not only for damages as aforementioned, but in addition I will permit
the Union in those cases to open up for adjudication
for damages any prior grievances now pending against
that Employer alleging violations of Article IV and
my Awards.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May 20, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 20th day of May, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me as
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

•
METROPOLITAN TAXICAB BOARD OF TRADE
1775 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
•; PLazst 7-0140

May 7, 1974

To:

Members of METROPOLITAN

From:

Maurice H. Goetz, Counsel

TO 15. (G 7S 1ST TT

The Union has filed many hundreds of grievances against some of our member
fleets alleging violation of Article 4 (Union Shop Provision) of the Collective Bargaining A g r e e m e n t . Initial investigation has indicated that many hundreds (if not
t h o u s a n d s ) of employees have been p e r m i t t e d to work in our industry, over the last
s e v e r a l y e a r s , without being required to join the Union after 30 days, as required
in our c o n t r a c t . If thio is borne out by evidence at a hearing, it would result in
each of you being liable for the arriount of dues and/or initiation fees to which the
Union would have been entitled. In addition, the Impartial Arbitrator in our industry, Eric Schmertz, has indicated in a prior award that our employers may be
liable to punative damages for continuing violations of this type.

-

Since the aforementioned award is lengthy, covering some six pages which cite
the details against specific garage members of our Association, we are reprinting
below only those extracts from said award that are pertinent to the entire industry:
"I find the above named companies, in the instances indicated below,
breached Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and my
Industry-wide Award and Order of June 23, 1970. Where appropriate
-I have awarded money damages to be paid by the Company to the Union.
In this proceeding the damages shall be deemed 'ordinary or compensatory', measured by the amount of an employee's delinquency in payment of dues or initiation fee to the Union. However, the measure of
damages awarded in this proceeding should not be construed as the
limit of potential damages for other or subsequent cases involving
breaches of Article IV and my Industry-wide Award and Order. I
reserve the right to Award more extensive damages, including punitive damages especially in cases of repeated violations of Article IV
and my Industry-wide Award and Order subsequent to the date of that
Award and O r d e r . "

'.
-

I cannot emphasize strongly enough how this type of violation inflames our relationship ivith the Union. They, too, are having financial difficulties and since
enforcement of the Union Dues Payment Requirement does not cost our fleets any
money, they view this type of violation as an intentional act of hostility.
I urge all of you to check up on all of your employees, IMMEDLATELY, and
make certain that anyone employed by you more than 30 days has joined the Union.
In each case in which you find a delinquency, please put an immediate stop to it
and r e q u i r e that employee to join and pay his dues as soon as possible.

!;

With the advent of a central computer system at the Union offices, delinquency
will be located and the e m p l o y e r s will 02 penalized. Please let's avoid such a
condition coming to pass.

I

MHG/ys
(#40 - '74)
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
Local 3036 New York City Taxi Drivers
Union, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade,, Inc.,
on behalf of Dalit,, loRaB Ardee, Blue Haven,
G & M, Mine and Dynamic Garages

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement: betr/ceo. the above named parties,, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties
ac hearings or- September 2 and 4 B 1970s rasdero the following
AWARD:
I find that the above named coronanies, In the instances indicated below, breached Arr.icle IV of
the Collective B<1 ^gaining Agreement and my Industrywide Award and Order of June 23, 1970. Where approp'rlatce I have awardecfmon^y damageir~T,o be paid by
the Company to the Union. In this proceeding the
damages shall be deetaed "ordinary or compensatory,"
measured by the amount of an employee's delinquency
in payment of dues or initiation fee to the Union.
However, the measure of damages awarded in this pro°
ceeding sl.ould not be conr.trued as the limit of
pot- ntial damages for other or subsequent cases involving breaches of Article IV and ray Industry-wide
Award and Order. I reserve the right to Award more
extensive damages, including punitive damages
especially 5n cacos of repeated violations of Article
IV and my Industry-wide Award and Or e'er subsequent
to the date of that Av;ard and Order.
I find that Dalk Garage violated Article IV of the
contract and my Industry-wide Award c.nd Order of
June 239 1970 when, on August 4, 1970 it dispatched
employees I. Mandell, G. Colon, E. Rosa, R. Pattwell,
H, Stone and J. Bard, when each was delinquent In
the payraant of Union dues lor the month of July, 1970.
The Company shall pay to the Union the amount: of
$3.50 for each of said employees, or a total of $21
e.e damages.

^ _^ •''•'
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1 find that Da Ik Garage broached Article- IV of the
contract and my Indus1i y--vi.de Award and Ordrr of
June 23, 1970, when, or August 4 it dispatched employees M. Bornstein ar 1 R. Braymnn. Based on the
Companyes records and ihe Company's contention that
each was a "new hire/' all three, when dispatched
os August 4 9 had not ye. t joined the Union though
they had been in the Company's employ more than 3C
calendar days as of that date. Accordingly, the
Company shall pay to the Union $10 for each employee9 or a total of $20 as damages.
The Union has not established that employee R.
Mennella was dispatched on August 4, 1970, and therefore its grievance that he was dispatched while delinquent in payment of Union duess is denied.
The evidence indicates that employee J, Myers was
hired by Da Ik on August: 3, one day before he was
dispatched. However, his payment to the Union oa
August 5 of an initiation fee and back duess is
evidence of his prior employment in the Industry,
It is clear that on neither August 3rd or 4th did
the Company make any inquiry of Myers in order to
ascertain whether he was new to the Industry or
only new to this garage. Article IV and ray Industrywide Award and Order requires that the employer
check a driver's Union membership card or book or
examine the driver's paid iro Union rerMni- b«fora
dispatching him. Had such been done or requested by
the Company in connection with Myers, his prior
status within the Industry might have been disclosed.
If he failed to make such disclosure the Company would
then hav:: been justified in considering him as a new
employee. But because the Company failed to make such
inquiry, I direct that the Company pay the Union damages in/che amount of $10.
I find that lona Garage: violated Article IV of the
contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order of June
23, 1970 when, on August 4, 1970, it dispatched employees J. Torres and U. Carter ac a time that each
was delinquent in :he payment of Union dues for the
month of July, 1970, Trie Company shall pay to the
Union the amount of $3.50 for each said employee or
a total of $7 as damages.
1 find that Ardee Garage violated Article IV of the
contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order of
June 23 j 1970 when, on August 4, 1970 it dispatched
employees S 6 Perez and J. Mayer at" a time that each
was delinquent in the payment of Union dues for the
month of July 1970. The -Company shall pay to the
Union $3.50 (Perez) and $2.50 (C. Mayer, a part timer)
or a total of $6 as damages.

;', •

I find that Blue Haven Garage failed to comply with
the provisions of Article IV of the contract and my
Industrywide Award and Order of June 23, 1970, when
on August 43 1970,, it dispatched employee M. Sanatoria
without asking for his Union membership card or book
or patd up receipt, 4s stated in ray Industry-wide
Award and Order,, employees new to the Industry have
a 30 day probationary period before being required
to join the Union. But unless the employer knows
that the employee is net-? to the Industry, or asks
a driver new to his garage for a Union boolcD card cr
paid up receipt before dispatching hioi5 that employer
cannot determine whether that employee is entitled
to the 30 day probationary period. Therefore in the
instant case when the Company made no effort to ask
for any of those documents,, and did not know his
prior status, it failed to follow the requirements
of Article IV of the contract and my Industry-wide
Award and Order, Again,, had it made such inquiry
and had the employee stated that he was new to the
Industry, I would not find that the Company breached the contract or my prior Award if later evidence
disclosed that the employee had worked previously
in the Industry,, was delinquent in Uiiion dues and
had therefore misled the Company. Employees who
wilfully mis-informed a new employer in this regard would be subject to discipline, I vjill not
Award money damages iu this grievance because there
is no evidence to show that Sanabria was previously
employed in the Industry, (As ' distinguished from
the grievance concerning J. Myers (Dalk) )«, Also,
my rulings and observations in this situation are
dispositive only of this particular case and shall
not be construed by the parties as a precedent for
any subsequent matters„ I call attention to the fact
that Section 7 of Article XVIII of the contract calls
for an Industry-wide seniority list. Once such a
list is available and maintained on an up-to-date
basis, the prior service of any employee within the
Industry should be a matter of record and known to
both the Union and to employers covered by the contract,
I find that G & M Gsrage violated Article IV of the
contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order of
June 23, 1970,'when on August 4, 1970, it dispatched
employee V. Orti.2 when he was delinquent in payment
of Union dues for the months of April, May, June
and July, 1970; employee R. Saavedra when he was delinquent: in the payraent of Union cues for the month
of July 1970; and employee J. Wanromeller who failed
to join the Union and p-uy the initiation tee though
more than 30 calendar days after he entered the Company's employee had passed. The Company idiall pay
to the Union damages in the amount of $14 (for the

Ortiz violation); $3,50 (for

the Saavedra violation)

raid $10 (for the Uanrcauellor violation),, or a
of $27.50 as damages.
I find that Mine Garage violated Article IV of

contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order of
June 23, 1970, when on August 4, 1970 It dispatched
employees Kronenfeld and V 0 Sammareo, when each was
delinquent in payment of Union dues for the moath
of Julys 1970. The Company shall pay to the Union
Glb.fi eiCiOunt of $3«50 for each sold employee or ,a
total of $7 as damages„
j
I find that Dynamic Garage violated Article IV of

the contract and ray Industry-wide Award and Order
of June 23s 1970, when on the dates set forth in the
grievances It dispatched employees L. Rosenthai,
A 0 Viera, V. Dal Valle, J. Torres, R, Jenkins and
E0 Mulero when none of those employees could produce
evidence of. theirpaid up status as members of the
Union. The placing of money by the employee with
the employer,, in the form of cash,, money order or
check, to cover Union dues and/or initiation fee,
£o be remitted by the employer to the Union,, does
not constitute compliance with Article IV of the contract or my Industry-wide Award and Order. Therefore,
Ttfheo. thees employees paid the amounts of theii. d,e°
llnquency to the Company for remittance to the Union,
just prior to their being axspsccnea on the days in
questions it did not cure their delinquencies for
that day. Evidence of their paid up status with the
Union in the iorai of the documents referred to in my
InchxsCry-wide Award and (3rd -.1: of June 23, 1970, eust
be presented before the driver is dispatched. 1 will
not award damages in this case because the record indicates that the Union Shop Chairman, without authority from higher Union officials, may have led the
employer to balieve that the procedure followed x^ith
regard to these particular employees, on the particular days involved, was acceptable.
I find thnt Dynamic Garage ^iolsted Article IV of the
contract and RV Industry-wide Award and Order of June
23, 1970, when'on July 3, 1970 it dispatched employee
F 0 Jordon who, as of that date, had not joined the
Union though more than 30 calendar days had elapsed
from his date, of employment with this garage. The
Company shall pay the Union the sum of $10 as damages.
I find that Dynamic Garage violated Article IV of the
contract and ay Industry-wide Award and Order of June
23, 1970 when on July 10, it dispatched employee S.
Ward, a part-timer, when he uas delinquent in payment
of Union dues ior the month;; of February through June
1970, The Company shall pay the Union the sura of
$12.50 as damages,

'

I find that Dynamic Garage violated Article IV of
the contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order
of June 23, 1970, when on July 8, 1970, it permitted employee A. Rodriguez, an Inside man, to
continue at work though more than 30 days had passed since his date of employment and he had not
joined the Union. Hie Company shall pay the Union
the sum of $10 as damages„
J, find that Dynamic Garage.jviolated Article IV of
the contract and my Indus try-if ide Award and Order
of June 23s 1970, when on July 7 5 1970 It dispatched employee S. LaQuerra when he was delinquent In
Union, dues for the months February through June,
19700 I, will not Award money damages in this case
because there appears to have been some arrangement
between the Union Shop Committeeman and the Company
to give this employee, who had lost his license and
had been out of work since January of 1969, an opportunity to resume employment 'and earn some money bc°
fore paying past dues,
I find that Dynamic Garage violated Article IV of
the contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order
of June 23s 1970, when on July 1 and July 7, after
being told by the Union representative of his delinquency. It dispatched employee A, Starkey. Because the Company was placed on notice about this
employee's delinquency and prior employment within
the Industry before ho was alspatcnea on those two
clays, 1 Award'damages for the total amount of that
delinquency,, namely for the months of October, 1969
through June, 1970, Therefore the Company shall pay
to the Union the total sura of $31.50 as damages.
I find that Dynamic Garage violated Article IV of
the contract and my Industry-wide Award and Order of
June 23, 1970, when on July 6 S 1970 it dispatched
employee D. Bullock when he was delinquent in Union
dues for the period January through June 1970. 1
will not award money damages because the record indicateo that this employee was sent out pursuant to
some understanding between the Company and the Union
garage representative that an employee who had been
111 for extended periods of time may be given an
opportunity to work and earn money before being required to pay his delinquency. It should be stated
however, that the proper procedure In such a situation is for the employee to apply to Union headquarters for a special work permit which Is designed to achieve the same result.
The foregoing Awards of money damages are remedies
for the breaches of contract and my Industry-wide

Award and Order committed by the employers. Payment thereof by the employers to the Union does
not relieve the employees involved of the duty to
pay dues and initiation fees owed.

Eric J/Schrnertz

Impartial Chairman

DATED*. September 8 P 1970
STATE OF New York )S3 .
COUNTY OF New York)

Qa this 8th day of September, 1970, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schraertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who e-cecuted
going instrument arid he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
On behalf of Tom Robbins

AWARD

and
Metropolit an. Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc
On behalf of Dover Garage, Inc.
During the course of the hearing on June 11, 1974 the
above named grievant (Tom Robbins) and the above-named Union
and Employer reached the following agreed upon stipulation,
which I make my AWARD:
The above parties stipulate as follows regarding the
instant arbitration concerning whether reasonable
cause exists for the discharge of Tom Robbins.
It is agreed that the utilization of self help in
the form of a work stoppage to redress a grievance
is not justified and that all such grievances
should be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is
further agreed that no other remedy is permitted
and that the arbitration forum is fully capable
of redressing any and all grievances.
It is acknowledged that the work stoppage that
occurred at Dover Garage on May 14, 1974 is an impermissable method of handling a grievance. If
Tom Robbins instigated or encouraged such work
stoppage, Dover Garage would be justified in imposing a disciplinary penalty up to and including
discharge, subject to review under the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the contract. Whether
or not Mr. Robbins did so is not adjudicated at this
time. The rights of the parties on that question
are expressly reserved.
In the future if Mr. Robbins commits any violation
of any work rule at Dover Garage, the question of
penalty may be considered in light of his entire
work record, again subject to review under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.
The instant arbitration is withdrawn.

- 2 The parties may post or otherwise properly disseminate this AWARD.

Eric J; Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: June /71974
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this// day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

i

IMPARTIAL CHAIEMAIT, NE¥ YORK CITY TAXICAB IN;

in the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036. AFL-CIO

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Beard of Trade,.
Inc. on behalf of Jayson Operating
Corp,

]he undersigned, as impartial Chairman under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between tne above -named
parties makes the following findings and Award:
Jay 3 on Operating Oorp. has violated Article IV of
"Che Collective Bargaining Agreement and my Industry-wide
Awards of .June 23^ 1970, September 3,, 1970 and May 20, 1974,,,
during the period from f'ebruary 20, 197^ through November 27,
197^ by dispatching drivers who were not members in goodstanding of the Union (i.e. delinquent in the payment of
dues and/or initiation fee).

;

As liquidated damages for the

contract oreacn., tne Employer sna.il pay to tne union tne
sum of $3-200,

Payment shall be made within no more than

. twelve months from the date of this Award and In equal
monthly Installments of not less than 5250 per month, except
that this Smoloyer agrees that he will pay no less than

The Employer shall have the right to review the
records upon which the Union's claims nerein are based.

If

within two weeks from the date of this Award the Employer

the accuracy of those records,, the employer will
notify and discuss the matter with the uhion^ and if within
one 7,'eek thereafter the Employer and the Union are not in
agreement » the matter shall be referred back to the Impartial j
Onairman for resolution. . . .

;

¥ith regard to the period of time -prior to February
s,re reserved ~co males claim

Industry-Wide Awards if the jimtsloyer continues to
:h drivers who are not Union members in good-standing, ;
in this regard also extends to alleged

forth in my Prior Indus try-Wide Award, the
payment by the Employer of the foregoing sum shall not
relieve the individual employees involved of the dues and
initiation fees owed to the Union and the Union shall ret
tne rignt to collect said dues and initiation fees from said

_ne Union will proceed In the presentation of similar
.gainst all other Employers whom the Union contends
)lation of Article IT of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and my prior Industry-Wide Awards for the period
~ =.~r\~__~".~.=_••-•-- 20, l'-574- t'^rou°"h November 2T, 15~7^»

In the interests

of expedition, the Union will prepare and submit to counsel
for metropolitan Taxicab Board of Irade its total claims
atainst each of said Employers for said period* together
with the sum it would accept as liquidated damages in settle- '

j

and with which the parties are familiar,

i

if the foregoing is not complied 7rith by thisEmployer, the Union shall have the right to petition the
Impartial Chairman for an immediat

or extra-

s u om ^ -^ ea to
Impartial Chairman for immediat
is applicable only to the Union1s claims against this and
oi^ner -employers xor tne period 01 t^imie zrom ^eoruary 20» 157^"
to ZTovember 27,
o -or a n a m e n m e n -

o - m - r o r - n u s r-e

Awards remain a p l i c a b l e for relevant
*-•. ~\i I Q v*y —
„' > c
U X U.ct_C V

•

eriods

Awars-* S ?
rior to

cisrf j

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NSW YORK

)
)

53,:

On this ~2^U day of December, ±9^-;
ally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz ~c
co me as the individual described in and v
foregoing instrument a,nd he acknpwledged ~
executed the same.

•'ore me person- !
Imowi and known <
executed the
• thap he

MAURICE L ' " , C £ r i
lI^1'.OF
No. 30-8839725

,

Quaiifitd in Nassau Counts; /
Term Expires March 30, 19%?

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi DriverX , Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.,
On Behalf of Circle Garage and Chad
Operating Corp.

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
at hearings duly held on October 14, 1974, makes the following
AWARD:
The grievance of Irving Adler against Circle
Garage, that he was improperly terminated and/
or improperly denied reemployment, is denied.
I find that the grievant quit his employment
when he left his job on or about July 25, 1974,
(and did not return until early September) after
his request for a leave of absence for that
period was denied by the Employer. Under Article
XXIX Section 1 of the contract, the Employer has
discretion in granting or denying a request for a
leave of absence. But that discretion is not
absolute or unchallengeable. Where an employee
has a bona fide and pressing need for a leave
of absence, where the period of the leave requested
is of reasonable duration considering the need,
where approval has been granted by the Union, an
Employer's denial may be an abuse or an improper
exercise of his discretion. In short, implicit in
Article XXIX Section 1 is that an Employer may not
unreasonably withhold his approval of a bona fide
request for a leave of absence. And this is
applicable whether the leave of absence requested
is during the summer months or at any other time.
However in the instant case the grievant has not
persuaded me that his request for a leave was for
a bona fide or compelling need nor has he established

-2that the reason he gave to the Employer met
that test. The record is unclear and the
evidence conflicting and offsetting as to
whether he asked for a leave "to visit his
Grandmother" or "to visit a sick Aunt and
Niece in California." If the former (which
the Employer contends was his reason and
for which there is evidentiary support) I
cannot fault the Employer for denying the
request during the busy summer season
especially when the leave was requested for
as long as five weeks. The grievant has not
offered sufficient evidence to establish that
his request was not "to visit his Grandmother"
but rather "to visit a sick Aunt and Niece."
So the grievant's case falls short of the requirement that the bona fides or compelling
nature of the need for the leave be established.
Also for either purpose I consider a request for
five weeks, covering the full month of August
and the first week in September when the taxicab industry is at its busiest and when drivers
are most needed, to be excessive and unwarranted.
I conclude that that amount of time off even to
go to California for the purpose alleged by the
grievant is longer than necessary and beyond what
the Employer need approve. Hence I do not deem
the Employer's denial of the leave of absence to
have been unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.
Inasmuch as the grievant left not only without
the Employer's approval, but in contravention of
the denial of the leave, the Employer had no :
obligation to reemploy him upon his return in
September.

The discharge of William Graham by Chad Operating
Corp., was for just cause. Over his year and a
half employment with this Employer the grievant has
been involved in ten accidents. I reject his
assertion that he was blameless each time. I have
stated in previous decisions that I accept the
principle of "accident proneness" as a valid basis
for an employee's termination following the
application of "progressive discipline." I deem
that the grievant falls into an accident-prone
category, and it is noted that prior to his discharge and his final accident he had previously

-3been twice suspended because of his accident record.
It is manifest that the taxicab industry has a special
duty of care and a responsibility for safety, to those
who ride in taxicabs and to the general public at large,
Considering that duty and responsibility, I conclude
that the grievant, whose accident record for whatever
reasons is excessive, would represent too much of a
risk if reinstated as a driver. Therefore I will not
require the Employer or any other employer in the industry to employ him in that capacity. The grievant is
a well educated, intelligent and personable individual,
who, it is hoped, will be able to find a pursue employsuccessfully in some other field or endeavor.

EricJ.Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

Dated: October 16, 1974
State of New York )gs
County of New York )
On this sixteenth day of October 1974, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

Commi

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
'

Larry Erlichman

1

'

and

1

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Marby Operating Corp.

Opinion
and
Award

'
'

The instant dispute was first initiated by Mr. Erlichman,
hereafter referred to as the "claimant" in Civil Court of the
City of New York, Small Claims Part.

The Court suggested, and

the claimant and the above named Employer agreed, that the
matter be determined by arbitration under the Arbitration Provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. and New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO.
The New York City Taxi Drivers Union Local 3036, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," set forth its position regarding this arbitration to the Undersigned orally prior to the
commencement of the Arbitration hearing, and in a written statement dated May 7, 1974.

The Union's written statement reads:

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NEW YORK CITY TAXI
DRIVERS UNION, LOCAL 3036, AFL-CIO, IN THE
MATTER OF LAWRENCE EHRLICHMAN AND MARBY
OPERATING CORP.
The position of the union in this matter is that
it approves the holding of the arbitration herein for
the following reasons:
The individual who has made the within complaint
did not advise the union of any grievance that he wished to be processed on his behalf and did not request
that any such grievance be processed. He thereby waived and/or forfeited any and all right to union representation at any stage of proceedings based on his complaint. It is the understanding of the union that the

- 2 complainant did, however, commence an action
against the employer in the Civil Court of the
City of New York, Small Claims Part, wherein
the Court advised the complainant that his only
remedy consistent with the collective bargaining agreement was to proceed with arbitration.
The Court set an adjourned return date and urged
that any arbitration be held before that date.
The union did not learn of any of these developments until a time directly prior to the last
such day for arbitration. It is only upon the
foregoing limited set of circumstances that the
union has consented to the holding of the within arbitration between complainant and the employer, and consequently the union does not participate further except to grant its continuing
approval and consent to the holding of the remainder of this arbitration.
Dated:

New York, New York '
May 7, 1974

Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) Donald F. Menagh
Attorney for New York City Taxi
Drivers Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO
In accordance with the foregoing, a hearing was held on
May 7, 1974 at the offices of the American Arbitration Association!
in New York City.
Employer appeared.

The claimant and representatives of the
All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to present their cases.
waived.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly

The claimant was a taxicab driver.

During the week

in question he worked two days and grossed $91.70 in bookings.
iOn one of the days, February 25, 1974, he was held up at«fun
point and robbed of approximately $50.00.
The claimant contends that of the balance of the bookings,
which he turned in to the Employer following the robbery, the
Employer retained more than what would have been its total share

- 3 At the hearing, the Undersigned, together with the claimant and representatives of the Employer, reviewed the applicable contract provisions and the respective mathematical calculations upon which the Employer and the claimant rely. Based
on these reviews it became clear that the Employer had not retained more than the share of the bookings to which it was entitled, and that the claimant's assertion that the Employer
kept a portion of his commission was inaccurate and unfounded.
The claimant acknowledged his error.
Specifically the claimant was a 43% driver.

That means

that of his total bookings each week the Employer gets 57%,
and he 43%.

Of his 'total bookings of $91.70 during the week

in question the Employer was entitled to retain over $50.00.
But the claimant did not turn in that amount following the
robbery.

He turned in less.

not receive its 57%.

Consequently the Employer did

And obviously there was neither enough

left for the claimant to receive any commission nor was any
of his commission entitlement included in the money which the
Employer received and retained. (The Employer has agreed to
waive the difference between what it received and the total
57%.)
However, based on the practice of this Employer an employee who is robbed under these circumstances has received a
$5.00 credit when he files a police report with the Employer.
Though the claimant did not file such a report by the date of
this hearing, the Employer agreed to pay him $5.00 if he did
so without delay following the hearing.

- 4 Accordingly the Undersigned as Impartial Arbitrator ren
ders the following Award;
1. The claim of Larry Erlichman that the Employer
retained commissions to which Erlichman was entitled, is unfounded and denied.
2. Provided Mr. Erlichman has filed a completed
police report with the Employer, the Employer
shall pay him the sum of $5.00.

Eric j. /Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May
1974
STATE of New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Driver's Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

INDUSTRY-WIDE AWARD

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Terminal Garage

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following INDUSTRY-WIDE AWARD:
The Employer's arrangement to lease some of
his cabs to employees who are bargaining unit
drivers is an interference with and in violation of the Union's rights of representation
and collective bargaining under the contract.
The Employer asserts that drivers who accept
the lease arrangement will remain employees
within the bargaining unit. As such, a lease
negotiated by the Employer directly with an
individual driver is clearly improper, inasmuch as the Union is the sole bargaining
agent for employees in the bargaining unit,
and individual employees may not, without the
Union's agreement or without the sanction of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, negotiate
terms and conditions of employment on their
own.
The Employer concedes that the terms and conditions of the lease are significantly different
than the terms and conditions of the collective
bargaining agreement. Hence the lease represents
a material change in the terms and conditions of
employment of the affected employees, and that
may not be done by the Employer unilaterally, or
even in agreement with individual employees during the life of the collective bargaining agreement without negotiating those material changes
in conditions of employment with the Union.

-2Additionally, I conclude that the lease
arrangement is not an "elimination of
service" or an elinination or change in
"processes" or a "curtail(ment) (of)
its operation" within the meaning of
Article III (Management) of the contract.
In short this particular leasing arrangement is not authorized by the Management
Article of the collective bargaining
agreement. It is not an elimination of a
service or a curtailment of an operation,
because the service continues but in a
different form. It is not a change in the
method of service or process because those
terms, in my view, refer to the means of
servicing the riding public. And the lease
arrangement makes no change in that service.
Rather it simply changes, radically, the
employment conditions of the employees.
Nor is the instant lease arrangement a
"lease" within the meaning of Article XXIII
of the contract. Under that Article an
employer may lease his fleet or a portion
thereof to another employer or to a person,
group or organization who assume employer
status. Under the instant disputed leasing
arrangement the lessee does not become an
employer, but remains an employee.
There being no authority in the contract
supportive of the Employers leasing arrangement, the Union's recognition, representation
and collective bargaining rights under Article
I must be deemed pre-eminent. And without the
Union's approval or agreenent the Employer may
not change the conditions of employment of
bargaining unit drivers from the conditions
set forth in the contract to a different set
of conditions under a lease.
In view of the foregoing it is unnecessary for
me to decide whether the Employer's lease arrangement is violative of Rule 89 of the Rules governing Drivers of Public Taxicabs and Public Coaches
of The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission.

-3Accordingly during the life or effective
period of the current collective bargaining
agreement the Employer may not lease his cabs
to employee drivers. Those leases already
entered into are deemed null and void and shall
be terminated forthwith. The affected drivers
shall remain as bargaining unit drivers under
the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement.
In view of the acknowledgement that other
employers in the Industry have entered into
similar lease arrangements with some of their
drivers or contemplate doing so, this Award,
barring any such arrangements, shall be deemed
Industry-wide.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: August 1, 1974
STATE OF NEW YORK ) ss> .
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
On this first day of August, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers
Local Union 3036, AFL-CIO

'
i
'
'
!

and

'
i

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. '
on behalf of Marby, Metro and Checker
'
Garages.
'

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, makes the following AWARD:

The discharge of Al Sysler by Marby Garage was
for just cause, and is upheld.
I do not accept the grievant's testimony on how the
accident happened. His explanation is implausible
and unbelievable. I conclude he was responsible for
the accident which was his fifth in a relatively short
period of employment. I am satisfied that he has been
previously placed on notice that his record of accidents was both excessive and unsatifactory. This last
accident demonstrates his inability or unwillingness
to heed that notice. His accident record, thus, appears
to be chronic. Under that circumstance the Employer
need not run the risk of his continued employment.

- 2 There was reasonable cause for the discharge
of Emilio Garcia of Metro Garage.
charge is upheld.

His dis-

I conclude he was insubor-

dinate and grossly disrespectful to a managerial employee as alleged by the Company.

How-

ever the Company shall pay him three days pay
because of its delay in providing him with a
termination slip, without which he was unable
to obtain employment elsewhere in the Industry.

Checker Garage violated the contract when it
employed and dispatched new drivers subsequent
to June 1, 1974 when the grievant, William Strickman sought but was denied employment as a full
time driver.

Based on many years of undisputed

service as a driver in the Industry prior to his
employment as a managerial dispatcher for Checker
Garage, the grievant acquired Industry-seniority.
Disregarding his period of service as a dispatcher
for Checker and irrespective of whether or not he
acquired Employer seniority when he drove on his
days off while working as a dispatcher, or when
he drove for two consecutive weeks between periods of employment as a dispatcher for Checker,
his previously acquired Industry-seniority entitled him to employment as a driver on and
after June 1, 1974, before the Company hired and
dispatched new drivers.

Article XXI Section 10

- 3 of the contract applies to both Industry and Employer seniority and accords the grievant this
priority.

To refuse him a bargaining unit job,

but to hire new drivers instead is inconsistent
with the provision of Section 10 that "senior
drivers not lose anything because of new drivers."
Therefore the Company erred when it refused him employment as a driver on June 1, 1974 and when on
and after that date it hired drivers with no seniority.

There is nothing in the contract which ex-

cludes from Section 10 a person who previously worked as a managerial employee at the garage where he
seeks bargaining unit employment based on bargaining unit acquired Industry seniority.

Nor does it

provide for loss of Industry seniority upon assuming a managerial j ob.
I understand the Company's reluctance to hire, as
a bargaining unit driver a person who previously
worked in the same garage in a managerial position.
In his latter capacity he supervised and may have
disciplined bargaining unit members.

But the con--

tract does not accord the Employer that selective
right, nor is there evidence in this record that
the grievant, when he worked in a managerial capacity, carried on these managerial duties in such
a way as to raise potential difficulties between
himself and

other bargaining unit employees upon

his return to the bargaining unit.

In accordance

- 4with Article XXI Section 10, the Company shall
not refuse to employ and dispatch the grievant
as a driver.

Because I am not persuaded that he

could not have worked elsewhere, his claim for
back pay is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York )
€OUNTY OF New York) fa":
On this
day of July, 1974, before me came and appeared
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and
he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

in the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
'

Larry Erlichman

1

'

and

1

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Marby Operating Corp.

Opinion
and
Award

'
'

i

The instant dispute was first initiated by Mr. Erlichman,
hereafter referred to as the "claimant" in Civil Court of the
City of New York, Small Claims Part.

The Court suggested, and

the claimant and the above named Employer agreed, that the
matter be determined by arbitration under the Arbitration Provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. and New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO.
The New York City Taxi Drivers Union Local 3036, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," set forth its position regarding this arbitration to the Undersigned orally prior to the
commencement of the Arbitration hearing, and in a written statement dated May 7, 1974.

The Union's written statement reads:

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NEW YORK CITY TAXI
DRIVERS UNION, LOCAL 3036, AFL-CIO, IN THE
MATTER OF LAWRENCE EHRLICHMAN AND MARBY
OPERATING CORP.
The position of the union in this matter is that
it approves the holding of the arbitration herein for
the following reasons:
The individual who has made the within complaint
did not advise the union of any grievance that he wished to be processed on his behalf and did not request
that any such grievance be processed. He thereby waived and/or forfeited any and all right to union representation at any stage of proceedings based on his complaint. It is the understanding of the union that the

- 2 complainant did, however, commence an action
against the employer in the Civil Court of the
City of New York, Small Claims Part, wherein
the Court advised the complainant that his only
remedy consistent with the collective bargaining agreement was to proceed with arbitration.
The Court set an adjourned return date and urged
that any arbitration be held before that date.
The union did not learn of any of these developments until a time directly prior to the last
such day for arbitration. It is only upon the
foregoing limited set of circumstances that the
union has consented to the holding of the within arbitration between complainant and the employer, and consequently the union does not participate further except to grant its continuing
approval and consent to the holding of the remainder of this arbitration.
Dated:

New York, New York '
May 7, 1974

Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) Donald F. Menagh
Attorney for New York City Taxi
Drivers Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO I
In accordance with the foregoing, a hearing was held on
May 7, 1974 at the offices of the American Arbitration Association i
in New York City.
Employer appeared.

The claimant and representatives of the
All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to present their cases.
waived.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly

The claimant was a taxicab driver.

During the week

in question he worked two da'ys and grossed $91.70 in bookings.
jiOn one of the days, February 25, 1974, he was held up at fun
jpoint and robbed of approximately $50.00.
The claimant contends that of the balance of the bookings, j
Ijwhich he turned in to the Employer following the robbery, the
Employer retained more than what would have been its total share

there:

- 3 At the hearing, the Undersigned, together with the claimant and representatives of the Employer, reviewed the applicable contract provisions and the respective mathematical calculations upon which the Employer and the claimant rely. Based
on these reviews it became clear that the Employer had not retained more than the share of the bookings to which it was entitled, and that the claimant's assertion that the Employer
kept a portion of his commission was inaccurate and unfounded.
The claimant acknowledged his error.
Specifically the claimant was a 43% driver.

That means

that of his total bookings each week the Employer gets 5770
and he 43%.

Of his 'total bookings of $91.70 during the week

in question the Employer was entitled to retain over $50.00.
But the claimant did not turn in that amount following the
robbery.

He turned in less.

not receive its 57%.

Consequently the Employer did

And obviously there was neither enough

left for the claimant to receive any commission nor was any
of his commission entitlement included in the money which the
Employer received and retained. (The Employer has agreed to
waive the difference between what it received and the total
57%.)
However, based on the practice of this Employer an employee who is robbed under these circumstances has received a
$5.00 credit when he files a police report with the Employer.
Though the claimant did not file such a report by the date of
this hearing, the Employer agreed to pay him $5.00 if he did
so without delay following the hearing.

- 4Accordingly the Undersigned as Impartial Arbitrator ren
ders the following Award;
1. The claim of Larry Erlichman that the Employer
retained commissions to which Erlichman was entitled, is unfounded and denied.
2. Provided Mr. Erlichman has filed a completed
police report with the Employer, the Employer
shall pay him the sum of $5.00.

Eric J. /Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May
1974
STATE of New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

May 14, 1974

Maurice H. Goetz, Esq.
Rosenman Colin Kay Petschek Freund & Emil

575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Mr. Goetz:

Re; Larry Erlichman - and - Metropolitan
Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. on behalf
of Marby Operating Corp.
f

I enclose a duly executed copy of my Award and Opinion
in the above matter.
Very truly yours
Eric "J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

EJS :ha
encl.

May 14, 1974
Donald F. Menagh, Esq.
Menagh, Trainor & Finger
130 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016

Re: Laery Erlichman - and - Metropolitan
Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. on behalf
of Marby Operating Corp.
Dear Mr. Menagh:
I have this day forwaoded a copy of my Award and
Opinion in the above matter to Counsel for the Employer,
The informational copy is enclosed herewith for your
files.
I neglected to get Mr. Erlichman1s address. If
you or the Union would let me know what it is I will
transmit a copy to him without delay.
Very truly yours
Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
EJS:ha

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NEW YORK CITY TAXI
DRIVERS UNION, LOCAL 3036, AFL-CIO, IN THE
MATTER OF LAWRENCE EHRLICHMAN AND MARBY
OPERATING CORP.
The position of the union in this matter is that it
approves the holding of the arbitration herein for the following
reasons:
The individual who has made the within complaint did
not advise the union of any grievance that he wished to be processed on his behalf and did not request that any such grievance
be processed.

He thereby waived and/or forfeited any and all

right to union representation at any stage of proceedings based
on his complaint.

It is the understanding of the union that the;
r

complainant did, however, commence an action against the employer
in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Small Claims Part,
wherein the Court advised the complainant that his only remedy
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement was to proceed with arbitration.

The Court set an adjourned return date

and urged that any arbitration be held before that date.

The

union did not learn of any of these developments until a time
directly prior to the last such day for arbitration.

It is only

upon the foregoing limited set of circumstances that the union
has consented to the holding of the within arbitration between
complainant and the employer, and consequently the union does
not participate further except to grant its continuing approval
and consent to the holding of the remainder of this arbitration.
Dated:

New York, New York
May 7, 1974
Respectfully submitted,

•^ '
"

_
~-_

4$-*~#.t6\.
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Attorney for New York/ City Taxi
Drivers Union, Local '3036, AFLCIO.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
Committee of Interns and Residents:
of New York City
:
:
-and:
:
Mount Sinai Medical Center
:
_

OPINION
and
AWARD
Case No. 1330-0394-74

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Hospital fail to provide obstetrical
and medical service benefits to the wives of
the following House Staff Officers in violation
of Article VI of the contract?
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.

Mark Altschuler
Michael Davis
Joseph Williams
Robert Lane

Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.

Charles Nissman
James Mond
Julius Shulman
Allen Kisner

If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on July 29, 1974 at which time representatives
of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The pertinent part of Article VI reads;

Each League Hospital shall maintain and shall
not diminish Blue Cross, Blue Shield, Major
Medical and/or free hospitalization and medical
service benefits which were provided to House
Staff Officers on October 1, 1972.
It is undisputed, in the instant case, that the wives of
the grievants are covered under the foregoing contract provision.
It is also undisputed that up to some time in 1973, and
therefore as of October 1, 1972 obstetrical care and related
medical services were provided to the wives of the House Staff
Officers by attending physicians at the hospital.

The Union

-2contends that this type of obstetrical service constitutes "free
medical service benefits" not to be diminished, within the meaning of the foregoing contract peovision.

It seeks reimbursement

to the grievants for the costs they incurred or will incur for
comparable private obstetrical services.
The Hospital asserts that Article VI was not intended to
cover or continue obstetrical care and related medical services
by attending physicians.

Acknowledging

that such service was

rendered to House Staff Officers until sometime in 1973, the
Hospital contends however, that it was simply a professional
courtesy voluntarily extended by individual attending physicians
to fellow House Staff physicians; that it was not a service
rendered by the Hospital; that the Hospital did not and cannot
now control or direct an attending physician to perform that
service; and that when attending physicians discontinued the
professional courtesy and began charging for their services in
and after 1973, the Hospital was not obligated to provide an
alternative comparable benefit.

In short it is the position of

the Hospital, which does not provide Blue Shield coverage, that
so far as obstetrical and related medical services are concerned
it is required to provide services through its clinic only.
I uphold the Union's case because the contract on its face
supports the Union and because the Hospital has not proved the
defenses on which it relies.

The Hospital merely asserts that

it does not control the work of attending physicians.

But no

evidence was offered to show that the Hospital does not have this
measure of control or was unable to direct or persuade attending
physicians to continue this free service.

Nor did an attending

physician testify that his previous service was only a professional courtesy and that he would not continue to render it if

-3requested or instructed to do so by the Hospital.

The question

df the degree of control that the Hospital has over the attending physicians is unclear in this record and controverted.

In

view of that fact and that attending physicians did provide free
obstetrical services to the House Staff until 1973, the burden
is on the Hospital to establish that the change since 1973 was
and is beyond its control.

The Hospital has not done so to my

satisfaction.
Additionally and significant in my judgement is that the
foregoing disputed contract language was first introduced into
the collective bargaining agreement in 1970.

At that time the

Hospital knew or should have known that attending physicians
were providing free obstetrical services to the House Staff.

It

is both logical and reasonable therefore that the foregoing
contract language, negotiated at the very time that those
services were available, would be construed to cover existing
services, and to continue them undiminished for so long as that
language remained in the contract.

During the negotiations

culminating in the 1970 contract, the Hospital had the obvious
opportunity to contractually delineate between medical services
which it was obligated to provide and continue for the House
Staff, and those services which they then and now contend were
professional courtesies unrelated to the Hospital's obligations.
Yet the Hospital did not do so.

Instead it negotiated the fore-

going broad and unconditional language.

Also, that particular

language was drafted, introduced into the negotiations and into
the contract at the initiation of representatives of the
Hospital, and was a Hospital offer that exceeded the mediator's

-4proposal for a settlement of that issue.

For those reasons I

see no reason why the traditional rule that contract language
should be interpretated against the party who drafted and
offered it, should not be applicable in this case.
Accordingly I find that obstetrical and related medical
services accorded House Staff Officers by attending physicians
working at the Hospital on October 1, 1970, and until sometime
in 1973, were "medical service benefits" within the meaning
of the first sentence of Article VI of the contract.

And in

the absence of an evidentiary showing that the Hospital is unable to continue such medical service through attending
physicians, Article VI requires that it either take steps to
attempt to have attending physicians render such service or in
the alternative provide a comparable benefit.
In the instant case the grievants have incurred private
obstetrical expenses as a consequence of births which have
already occurred or present pregnancies.

The expenses of each

grievant as stipulated in the record (which run between $300
and $550) do not seem to me to be out of line with what
obstetricians charge.

Therefore I consider it an appropriate

and fair remedy that the Hospital reimburse each of the
grievants in the amounts so stipulated.

However the Union

and its members are cautioned that this decision is not a
license for House Staff Officers to seek obstetrical services
at luxurious or unreasonable fees.

In the event that the

-5Hospital is unable to arrange for obstetrical services through
its attending physicians or in some other comparable manner,
its obligation under Article VI for payment of private obstetrical fees is limited to the reasonable and customary level
for such services.
The Undersigned as the duly designated Arbitrator under
the arbitration agreement between the above named parties and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations makes the following AWARD:
The grievances of Drs. Altschuler, Davis,
Williams, Lane, Nissman, Mond, Shulman
and Kisner are granted. The Hospital
violated Article VI of the contract by
failing to undertake to continue free
obstetrical and related medical services
by attending physicians working at the
Hospital for the wives of House Staff
Officers, and by failing to provide an
alternative comparanle benefit. The
Hospital shall reimburse each grievant
in the amount stipulated in the record
for private obstetrical services. The
Hospital's obligation is limited to the
payment of reasonable and customary fees
for obstetrical services.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September
, 1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of September, 1974, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Employer Trustees and The
Union Trustees of The Mosaic
and Terrazzo Suplemental
Unemployment Benefits Fund

OPINION AND AWARD

In accordance with Article III, Section II of the
Agreement and Declaration of Trust dated July 1, 1970 the
Undersigned

was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and

decide issues over which the Union and Employer Trustees
of the above named fund are deadlocked.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on December 4, 1974, at which time
representatives of the Employer and Union Trustees appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Two issues are in dispute.

First, the Employer

Trustees complain that the Union Trustees will not provide
them with a prepared list of members who are drawing benefits
from the Suplemental Unemployment Benefits Fund.

The

Employer Trustees explain that they need this list to verify
the bona fides of the claims.

And second, that the fee of

counsel for services on behalf of the Employer Trustees in
this proceeding be paid by the Fund.
The Union Trustees do not seriously dispute the right
of the Employer Trustees to the list per se, nor do they
dispute the fiduciary duty of the Employer Trustees to verify

-2the legitimacy of the claims.

Rather the Union Trustees

object to the use to which that list has been put by Employer
members of the Terrazzo and Mosaic Contractors Association.
The Union Trustees contend that for the short time it was
made available to the Employer Trustees, the list was sent
by those Trustees to Employer members of the Association to
verify that benefits were not being paid to employees actively
employed; but that the Employers used the list for another
purpose, namely to hire, on a selective basis, persons of
their choice whose names appeared on the list.
hiring practices are discriminatory

And that such

and violative of a long

standing past practice of "going through the Union" to obtain
employees.

It is because of this alleged use of the list,

which the Union finds objectionable, that the Union Trustees
have now refused to make the list available to the Employer
Trustees.
The Union Trustees confuse the instant proceeding with
a dispute under the collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and the Contractors Association.

The Union Trustees

complaint about how the list has been used by the Employers is
simply not within the jurisdiction of this arbitration hearing.
This arbitrator's authority stems from the Agreement and
Declaration of Trust and is limited to deciding disputes
between the Trustees involving the application and interpretation
of the Trust Agreement.

It does not extend to cover the

-3practices or conduct of Employer members of the Association,
particularly hiring practices.

That question, involving as

it does a subject possibly covered by the collective bargaining agreement, but certainly not covered by the Trust Agreement,
places in issue the application and interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement and is beyond the authority
of this arbitration proceeding.

If the Union Trustees or the

Union believe that Employers are misusing the list of members
drawing benefits from the Fund, by using the list to engage
in discriminatory hiring or hiring methods contrary to required practice, that constitutes a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement, and the Union's right to file
such a grievance

under the appropriate provisions of the

collective bargaining agreement is reserved.

Similarly the

rights of the parties on the merits and the arbitrability of
such a dispute are

reserved.

In claiming that the fee of counsel for representing
them in this proceeding should be paid by the Fund, the
Employer Trustees rely on Article II Section 4 and Article III
Section 11 of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust.
support that claim.

Neither

I am not persuaded that the reference to

"employment of.... legal.... assistance" in Section 4 of Article
II was intended to apply to an adversary dispute between the
two sets of Trustees.

That Section relates, as I see it, to

the establishment of the Trust and to its normal administration

-4(i.e. collecting contributions and administering the business
affairs for which the Trust was established.)

The instant

dispute does not fall within that purpose.
The phrase "the cost and expenses incidental to any
such proceedings shall be borne by the Trust Fund" set forth
in Section II or Article III is a provision common to most
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, or
in agreements like the instant one, which provide for the
arbitration of disputes or deadlocks.

It has been regularly

interpretated to apply to the arbitrator's fee
and the administrative

and expenses

fee if any of the arbitration tribunal.

It has not been interpreted to cover either the costs or fees
of counsel for either side to the dispute, or to the costs or
expenses of witnesses produced by either side.

The expenses

of counsel and witnesses are borne by the party utilizing or
calling them.

Section II of Article III expressly deals with

the arbitration of disputes among the Trustees.

Had the parties

intended that the foregoing phrase go beyond its customary
meaning to include counsel fees arising from the adversary
arbitration hearing, they could and should have so provided
explicitly.

That they did not leaves the phrase with its

customary and well settled meaning - excluding counsel fees
of the type claimed by the Employer Trustees in this case.

-5The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator
under the arbitration agreement in the above matter, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
1. The list regularly prepared by the
Union Trustees, of members drawing benefits
from the Suplemental Unemployment Benefits
Fund shall be made available by the Union
Trustees to the Employer Trustees.
2. The Employer Trustees may utilize the
list to verify the legitimacy of the claims.
If they circulate the list among Employers
it shall be solely for that purpose.
3. As stipulated by the parties medical
information about a person on the list shall
be deemed confidential. It may be known to
the Trustees in their fiduciary capacity, but
shall not be available or made known to
Employers or the Union without the consent of
the person involved.
4. If the Union Trustees or the Union believe
that the list is being used by any Employer
member of the Association to hire personnel in
an alleged discriminatory manner or allegedly
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement or proper hiring practices, the Union may
grieve under the collective bargaining agreement.
The rights of the Union and the Employers with
regard to the merits or arbitrability of such a
grievance are expressly reserved.
5. The claim of the Employer Trustees that the
fee of counsel representing them in this arbitration proceeding be paid by the Fund, is denied.

DATED: December 26, 1974
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF: New York)ss.

Er/ic J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty sixth day of December, 1974 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
knpwn to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foreging instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
Case No. 1330-0772-74

